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Brutality you can resist. If I slap your face, you can slap me back 
– probably harder than I can. But if friendliness and consideration 
for the underdog comes from the heart, show me the human being 
who can resist it. 
 
Hanns Scharff 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Oleszkiewicz, S. (2016). Eliciting human intelligence: A conceptualization and empirical 
testing of the Scharff technique. Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg. 
 
This thesis is on how to elicit intelligence from human sources with the principal aim 
being to examine the efficacy of the tactics employed by the renowned WWII interrogator 
Hanns Scharff. A novel experimental set-up (as well as new dependent measures) was 
introduced to evaluate the efficacy of different human intelligence gathering techniques. 
Participants were given information about a planned terrorist attack, asked to take on the 
role of “sources”, and instructed to be semi-cooperative in a subsequent interview. 
In Study I (N = 60), interviews were conducted over the phone. The Scharff 
technique (conceptualized to include five tactics) was compared to the direct approach (a 
combination of open-ended and specific questions). The Scharff technique resulted in 
relatively more new information and led sources to underestimate how much new 
information they revealed. With the Direct Approach, sources overestimated how much 
new information they revealed. 
In Study II (N = 119), interacting parties met face-to-face and the sources were 
allowed to lie. Two versions of the Scharff technique were compared to the direct 
approach. The Scharff confirmation technique made use of claims that included the 
correct alternative while the Scharff disconfirmation/confirmation technique made use of 
a mix of correct and incorrect claims. The Scharff confirmation technique resulted in 
more new information than the Scharff disconfirmation/confirmation technique and the 
direct approach. Sources interviewed using the Scharff techniques had a more difficult 
time reading the interviewer’s information objectives and underestimated their 
contribution of new information. Sources interviewed using the direct approach 
overestimated how much new information they revealed. 
In Study III (N = 200) the interview techniques were used with four different types 
of sources varying in both their levels of cooperation and capability to provide 
information as follows: (a) less willing/less able, (b) less willing/more able, (c) more 
willing, less able, and (d) more willing/more able. The Scharff technique was compared to 
the direct approach. Overall, the Scharff technique resulted in relatively more new 
information, particularly when interviewing less cooperative sources. Furthermore, 
sources interviewed using the Scharff technique had a more difficult time reading the 
interviewer’s information objectives and consistently underestimated their contribution of 
new information. 
This thesis provides a psychological framework for and a conceptualization of the 
Scharff technique. Furthermore, the thesis introduces an experimental set-up mirroring a 
human intelligence interaction and offers a new set of dependent measures for mapping 
the efficacy of intelligence gathering techniques. In sum, this thesis provides support for 
the Scharff technique as an effective tool for eliciting information from human sources. 
Keywords: The Scharff technique, human intelligence gathering, information elicitation 
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SWEDISH SUMMARY 
 
 
Många anser att Hanns Scharff (1907-1992) var en av andra världskrigets mest 
framstående förhörsledare. I kontrast till många av sina kollegor som pressade krigsfångar 
med hotfulla metoder praktiserade Scharff vänliga samtal. Detta ledde inte bara till att 
Scharff knöt bekantskaper som höll långt efter andra världskrigets slut, samtalen 
medförde även att de brittiska och amerikanska stridspiloter som Scharff förhörde sällan 
upplevde att de lämnat någon information av värde. Samtidigt visade Scharffs resultat att 
han var Luftwaffes främsta förhörsledare. 
 
Den så kallade Scharff-tekniken kan beskrivas som ett koncept bestående av fem olika 
taktiker. Scharff hade alltid ett vänligt förhållningssätt och var väl bekant med brittisk och 
amerikansk kutym. Han brukade inleda förhöret med en lång och övertygande berättelse 
som tydliggjorde att han var väl informerad om krigsfången och dennes situation. Syftet 
med en sådan inledning var att bygga en illusion av att det mesta redan var känt. Vidare 
hade Scharff som regel att aldrig pressa fram information och undvek att ställa direkta 
frågor. Istället gav Scharff sina fångar möjligheter att korrigera hans utsagor eller lämnade 
luckor i sina berättelser som fångarna kunde fylla i. Scharff brukade således formulera 
påståenden vilka han ville få bekräftade eller dementerade av sina fångar 
(confirmation/disconfirmation). En viktig princip var att Scharff aldrig avslöjade när 
fångarna lämnade uppgifter som gick utöver hans egen kunskap. 
 
 
Syfte och procedur 
Underrättelseinhämtning handlar om att samla in information. Informationsinsamlandet 
kan ske på många olika sätt och sättet på vilket underrättelser samlas in bestäms ofta av 
källan till informationen. Att samla in underrättelser från mänskliga källor kan beskrivas 
som att utvinna information genom interaktioner med andra människor. Målet med 
underrättelseinhämtning är att upprätthålla den nationella säkerheten genom att 
exempelvis förebygga olagliga aktiviteter innan de sker. Ett specifikt mål i 
underrättelsesammanhang kallas för elicitering. Elicitering syftar till att samla in 
information på sådant vis att källan (a) underskattar sitt eget bidrag och (b) hålls ovetande 
om vad intervjuaren vill veta. 
 
Rättspsykologisk forskning har under lång tid granskat polisens förhör med misstänkta. 
Inom detta område har forskningen bidragit med viktiga insikter gällande bland annat 
falska erkännanden, sanna medgivanden och lögndetektion. Det är dock anmärkningsvärt 
att det i princip inte finns någon forskning om intervjumetoder för att samla in 
underrättelser från personer som inte är fullt samarbetsvilliga. Då detta område är 
tämligen outforskat har denna avhandling utgått från den högt ansedda förhörsledaren 
Hanns Scharff och utvärdera hans metod i en experimentell miljö. Således hade denna 
avhandling fem syften; (1) att introducera Scharff-tekniken, (2) att knyta Scharffs taktiker 
till psykologisk forskning, (3) att konceptualisera taktikerna till en sammanhängande 
teknik, (4) att introducera en experimentell procedur som uppfyller centrala aspekter av 
  
ett underrättelseinhämtningsscenario och (5) att utveckla nya mätinstrument för att 
utvärdera effektiviteten hos dessa intervjumetoder. Det mer allmänna syftet med 
avhandlingen var att genomföra den första vetenskapliga undersökningen av den så 
kallade Scharff-tekniken. 
 
För att kunna jämföra olika underrättelseinhämtande metoder skapades ett experimentellt 
scenario med följande utmärkande drag: Intervjuaren hade tillgång till ofullständiga 
uppgifter om en planerad fiktiv terroristattack. För att komplettera bilden av vad som 
planerades behövde intervjuaren söka information från en mänsklig källa. Denna källa 
hade kunskap som kunde fylla vissa, men inte alla, luckor i den redan befintliga 
informationen. Vidare övervägde källan ett dilemma; källan var motiverad att prata med 
intervjuaren, för att i utbyte få hjälp, men samtidigt motiverad att inte lämna all 
information som hen kände till, eftersom källan hade starka sociala band till 
terroristgruppen. Källan satt således på mer information än hen var villig att dela med sig 
av.  
 
För att utvärdera underrättelseinhämtande metoder utvecklades olika typer av 
effektivitetsmått för att fånga både objektiva och subjektiva aspekter av intervjun. De 
objektiva måtten utvärderade mängden och kvaliteten av den information källan lämnade 
under intervjun. Först transkriberades de inspelade intervjuerna. Sedan kodades de 
transkriberade intervjuerna via en checklista vilken listade all information som var 
tillgänglig för källan. De subjektiva måtten avsåg fånga källans upplevelser av intervjun. 
Dessa mått samlades in via tre enkäter. Den första enkäten bestod av skattningsskalor där 
källan fick skatta exempelvis hur svårt det var att förstå vilken information intervjuaren 
var ute efter. I den andra enkäten fick källan en checklista som var identisk med den som 
användes för att koda de transkriberade intervjuerna. Här fick källan kryssa i de specifika 
uppgifter källan upplevde att hen sagt under intervjun. Den sista enkäten var även den en 
identisk checklista, men nu kryssade källan i de uppgifter hen upplevde redan var känd av 
intervjuaren innan intervjun. För att ge en bredare bild av intervjuteknikernas faktiska 
verkanseffekt kombinerades vissa objektiva och subjektiva mått. Ett exempel är att det 
objektiva kodningschemat relaterades med det subjektiva kodningsschemat, vilket gav en 
uppfattning om källan över/underskattade mängden lämnad information som var ny för 
intervjuaren. 
 
 
De vetenskapliga studierna 
I Studie I genomfördes intervjuerna över telefon. Källorna blev antingen intervjuade med 
Scharff-tekniken eller med direct approach (en kombination av öppna och specifika 
frågor). Resultatet visade att Scharff-tekniken resulterade i en större mängd ny 
information än direct approach. Vidare underskattade källorna som intervjuades med 
Scharff-tekniken hur mycket ny information de lämnat under intervjun (de upplevde att de 
lämnat mindre ny information än vad de faktiskt gjort). I motsats till detta överskattade 
källorna som intervjuades med direct approach mängden lämnad ny information. 
 
  
I Studie II utvecklades det experimentella upplägget på tre punkter jämfört med Studie I. 
Källorna och intervjuarna möttes ansikte mot ansikte, källorna fick möjlighet att fabricera 
information under intervjun (detta var inte tillåtet i Studie I), och två versioner av Scharff-
tekniken jämfördes med direct approach. För den ena versionen presenterades tre 
påståenden som inkluderade korrekta alternativ (Scharff confirmation). För den andra 
versionen inkluderade ett av de tre påståendena ett felaktigt alternativ (Scharff 
dis/confirmation). Källorna eskorterades till ett rum där de blev intervjuade med en av de 
tre teknikerna. Resultatet visade att de båda versionerna av Scharff-tekniken resulterade i 
en större mängd ny information jämfört med direct approach. Oväntat nog resulterade 
Scharff confirmation i mer ny information än Scharff dis/confirmation. Vidare hade 
källorna som intervjuades med en av de två versionerna av Scharff-teknikerna (jämfört 
med direct approach) svårare att förstå vilken information intervjuaren var ute efter. 
Källorna som intervjuades med en av de två Scharff-versionerna underskattade sitt bidrag 
av ny information. Källorna som intervjuades med direct approach överskattade sitt bidrag 
av ny information. 
 
I Studie III utvecklades det experimentella upplägget genom att systematiskt variera 
källornas samarbetsnivå (mer/mindre villiga) och möjlighet att lämna information 
(mer/mindre kapabla). Resultatet visade att Scharff-tekniken resulterade i en större mängd 
ny information jämfört med direct approach. Vid jämförelse mellan de mer och mindre 
samarbetsvilliga källorna resulterade Scharff-tekniken i en högre proportion ny 
information vid intervjuer med de mindre (jämfört med de mer) samarbetsvilliga källorna. 
I kontrast till detta resulterade direct approach i en högre proportion ny information vid 
intervjuer med de mer (jämfört med de mindre) samarbetsvilliga källorna. Således ökade 
Scharff-teknikens relativa effektivitet att samla in ny information vid intervjuer med 
mindre samarbetsvilliga källor. Vidare hade källorna som intervjuades med Scharff-
tekniken (jämfört med direct approach) svårare att förstå vilken information intervjuaren 
var ute efter. Scharff-tekniken resulterade i att källorna underskattade sitt bidrag av ny 
information, medan källorna som intervjuades med direct approach generellt överskattade 
sitt bidrag av ny information. 
 
 
Slutsats 
I efterdyningarna av de terroristattacker som genomförts är behovet stort av vetenskapligt 
beprövade metoder för att samla in underrättelser. Denna avhandling introducerar en 
experimentell procedur och effektivitetsmått för att utvärdera intervjumetoder i ett 
underrättelseinhämtningsscenario. Studierna talar för att Scharff-tekniken är ett effektivt 
verktyg för att samla in underrättelser från mänskliga källor, och tekniken kan användas i 
flera olika sammanhang där källan inte är fullt samarbetsvillig. Denna avhandling är av 
praktisk relevans då den ger en grundläggande beskrivning av Scharff-tekniken. 
  
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
FIGURES AND TABLES i 
PREFACE iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v 
BACKGROUND 1 
Human Intelligence Gathering 2 
Intelligence gathering and law enforcement interviewing 3 
Research on law enforcement interviewing  3 
Emerging research on intelligence gathering 6 
Towards a Psychological Framework for the Scharff Technique  8 
Perspective taking  8 
Counter-interrogation strategies 8 
The tactics used by Hanns Scharff 9 
Conceptualizing the Scharff Technique 10 
Friendly approach  10 
Not pressing for information 10 
The illusion of knowing it all 11 
Confirmation/disconfirmation 12 
Ignore new information 13 
The Scharff Model 13 
Theoretical underpinnings 13 
Principles of the Scharff model 15 
Introducing an Experimental Paradigm and Measures of Efficacy 17 
Measures of efficacy 17 
Objective measures 18 
Subjective measures 19 
Combining measures 20 
SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 23 
General and Specific Aims 23 
Study I 24 
Study II 28 
Study III 32 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 37 
Main Findings 37 
New information 38 
Towards an illusion of knowing it all 38 
The claims 39 
Sources’ counter-interrogations strategies 40 
Masking information objectives 42 
The context for the Scharff technique 42 
  
  
 
 
 
  
Methodological Considerations 43 
The experimental paradigm 43 
The progression of the examination 44 
Theoretical Contribution 45 
The psychology of the Scharff technique 45 
Placing the Scharff technique in the research field 46 
Future Directions 49 
The experimental set-up 49 
The dependent measures 50 
Areas for research 51 
Ethical Considerations 52 
Psychologist involvement in practice 52 
Ethical aspects of real-life interviewing 52 
Receiving funds from a foreign criminal investigation entity 53 
Research ethics 54 
Practical Implications 54 
Limitations 55 
Limitations of the experimental set-up 55 
Limitations of the Scharff technique 55 
Conclusions 56 
REFERENCES 59 
APPENDIX I 
i 
 
FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1 A model of the Scharff technique 15 
Figure 2 The interaction effect for the subjective and objective scores of new 
information revealed for Study I 
26 
Figure 3 The interaction effect for the subjective and objective scores of new 
information revealed for Study II 
30 
Figure 4 The mean ratio of new information revealed for the interview 
conditions when interviewing sources with different levels of 
cooperation 
34 
Figure 5 An illustration of the interviewer’s information objectives 49 
   
   
Table 1 The progression of the three studies constituting this thesis 23 
Table 2 Effect sizes for the differences between the Scharff technique and 
direct approach interviews for the three studies constituting this thesis 
A-I 
   
 
 
ii 
 
iii 
 
PREFACE 
 
 
This thesis consists of a summary and the following three papers, which are referred to by 
their roman numerals: 
 
 
I. Oleszkiewicz, S., Granhag, P. A., & Cancino Montecinos, S. (2014). The 
Scharff-technique: Eliciting intelligence from human sources. Law and Human 
Behavior, 38, 478–489. doi: 10.1037/lhb0000085 
 
II. Oleszkiewicz, S., Granhag, P. A., & Kleinman, S. (2014). On eliciting 
intelligence from human sources: Contextualizing the Scharff-technique. 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28, 898–907. doi: 10.1002/acp.3073 
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BACKGROUND 
 
 
The April 2013 Boston marathon (US) and January 2015 Charlie Hebdo (France) attacks 
are two examples of the terrorist activity that continues to evolve on a global scale 
(Global Terrorism Index, 2014). The growing number of terror attacks, as well as 
subsequent reports of abusive treatment of detainees (Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 2014), have inspired researchers, practitioners and policy-makers to call for 
evidence based methods for ethical and effective intelligence gathering (e.g., Brandon, 
2011, 2014; Fallon, 2014; Fein, Lehner & Vossekuil, 2006; Justice, Bhatt, Brandon & 
Kleinman, 2010; Loftus, 2011; Obama, 2009). On a positive note, within the field of legal 
psychology, there are some already established subfields that touch upon issues relevant 
for gathering information from human sources (i.e., human intelligence gathering). For 
example, research on memory-enhancing techniques (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992), 
deception detection (Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; Vrij, 2008) and false confessions 
(Lassiter & Meissner, 2010) addresses some elements relevant to the intelligence 
gathering process. However, the evaluation of human intelligence gathering techniques 
differs from these fields of research. Specifically, in evaluating an intelligence gathering 
interview, one must consider not only the amount of information elicited, but also the 
source’s perception of and response to that particular exchange (Granhag, Cancinos 
Montecinos & Oleszkiewicz, 2015). Some researchers have recognized this gap in the 
academic literature and advanced our understanding of interviewing suspects by focusing 
on gathering so-called guilty knowledge rather than eliciting confessions and detecting 
deceit (Evans et al., 2013), but these studies are still quite limited in number. Furthermore, 
there has been no research focusing on developing measures to evaluate critical aspects 
typical for human intelligence interactions (e.g., the perceived amount of information 
revealed). Moreover, there have been few scientific examinations of the comparative 
efficacy of operationally relevant interview techniques listed in training manuals (Evans 
et al., 2014; Justice et al., 2010). 
 
In accordance with this identified need for research, this thesis provides an examination of 
the interview approach used by WWII interrogator Hanns Scharff (1907-1992). Scharff 
was a member of the German Luftwaffe and interrogated hundreds of Allied aircrew 
members (Toliver, 1997). History has recorded his performance as an interrogator at the 
Luftwaffe’s Intelligence and Evaluation Center (Dulag Luft). Scharff’s accomplishments 
are noteworthy in light of the large volume of intelligence he collected and his methods of 
gathering information seem quite remarkable. Rather than compelling prisoners to reveal 
information through the use of coercive methods and/or torture, his success has been 
argued to be the result of carefully orchestrated, psychologically sophisticated and 
friendly exchanges with his prisoners (Granhag, 2010). Many of today’s practitioners 
regard Hanns Scharff as an outstanding interrogator (Stone, Shoemaker & Dotti, 2010) 
and his methods stand in clear opposition to the “enhanced” methods that have been the 
focus of heated and politically charged debates (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
2014). Importantly, the majority of evidence for Scharff’s success has been anecdotal 
(Toliver, 1997), which calls for an empirical evaluation of the efficacy of his technique. 
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To remedy the paucity of research on human intelligence gathering techniques, this thesis 
has five general aims: (a) to introduce the so-called Scharff technique, (b) to provide a 
psychological framework for the technique, (c) to conceptualize the technique (i.e., 
describe the specific tactics of the technique), (d) to introduce an experimental set-up 
mirroring some key aspects of a human intelligence gathering interaction and (e) to 
introduce a set of dependent measures relevant for evaluating the efficacy of intelligence 
gathering techniques. The more general aim of this thesis is to conduct the first scientific 
examination of the Scharff technique and to assess the comparative efficacy of the 
technique. 
 
 
Human Intelligence Gathering 
 
Gathering intelligence refers to the process of collecting information. Information can be 
collected using various methods and the procedures for gathering intelligence are 
typically categorized by the source of the information. For example, gathering electronic 
transmissions from/to ships and satellites is called signal intelligence (SIGINT) and 
gathering information from media and public data is called open source intelligence 
(OSINT). This thesis focuses on gathering information from people, known as human 
intelligence (HUMINT). Human intelligence can best be described as the gathering of 
information by means of an interaction between two or more individuals (Justice et al., 
2010). The interaction occurs, for example, when military personnel question prisoners, 
police officers interrogate criminal suspects/witnesses or when such organizations handle 
informants. Human intelligence gathering thus revolves around the idea that information 
is collected through human communication (Kleinman, 2006). The purpose of gathering 
intelligence from human sources fits well within the broader purpose of any form of 
intelligence gathering: to identify information that satisfies intelligence objectives (US 
Army, 2006). Examples of such objectives are to ensure societal security and uphold 
civilian rights. By gathering this type of information, intelligence analysts can come to 
understand what activities are being planned and intervene before illegal activities take 
place (Bowman, 2010). The benefits of human intelligence can thus be substantial for 
national security purposes, for example, to prevent terrorist attacks. 
 
One specific form of intelligence gathering is information elicitation, of which the goal is 
to gather information in such a way that the source remains unaware of the purpose of the 
exchange (Justice et al., 2010). The elicitation process can be described as a sophisticated 
interaction used when the interviewer does not want the source to realize s/he is providing 
information to meet specific intelligence requirements. More precisely, information 
elicitation refers to gathering information in such a manner that the source (a) 
underestimates his/her contribution of new information and (b) remains unaware of the 
interviewer’s information objectives. 
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Intelligence gathering and law enforcement interviewing 
Human intelligence gathering is both similar to and different from the typical suspect 
interview conducted during criminal investigations. Evans, Meissner, Brandon, Russano 
and Kleinman (2010) identified three features shared by the human intelligence gathering 
interaction and the law enforcement interview (see also, Redlich, 2007). In brief, both 
forms of interaction: (i) profit from extensive pre-interaction planning, (ii) aim to gather 
information and (iii) demand a post-interaction assessment of the information gathered. 
However, there are also some differences between the two forms of interaction. Evans and 
colleagues (2010) proposed that the main difference between human intelligence 
gathering and law enforcement interviewing is the purpose of the interaction. The primary 
goal of a law enforcement interview is to gather information from a suspect relevant to a 
crime committed in the past (i.e., to collect evidence). Briefly put, the interviewer has to 
obtain reliable information from a suspect that is often perceived as uncooperative (Evans 
et al., 2010). Intelligence gathering, however, can be even more complex in nature. More 
specifically, in addition to mapping out past events with precise requirements, the 
intelligence scenario may involve generating information to map intentions, future plans 
and possible upcoming events (Hartwig, Meissner & Semel, 2014). A second difference is 
that, while the law enforcement interview is conducted in a formal, custodial setting, the 
intelligence interaction can occur as a casual conversation (e.g., at a bar). It should, 
however, be noted that the human intelligence interaction can also take place in a 
conventional, custodial setting where the source expects and receives direct questions 
from an interviewer. A third difference is that suspect interviews are characterized by an 
overt component (i.e., the suspect is aware of his/her situation). In contrast, the 
intelligence situation may be characterized by a covert component (i.e., the source 
provides information but may be unaware of the relevance of that information and/or the 
interviewer’s specific interest in obtaining that information). A fourth difference is that 
the law enforcement interview is typically relatively short, while the intelligence 
interview may take place on a more or less regular basis over the course of several years. 
Thus, the longer-term relationship between interviewer and source plays a more central 
role in intelligence gathering (see, Shumate & Borum, 2006). 
 
It should be noted that the differences and similarities between human intelligence 
gathering and suspect interviewing might hold more academic than practical relevance. In 
actual use, it can be argued that intelligence gathering, as discussed in this thesis, can 
occur during any type of human interaction (including a suspect interview). However, the 
definitional differences are important for understanding how two types of interviews are 
studied in the laboratory. 
 
 
Research on law enforcement interviewing 
Research on suspect interviewing has a rather extensive history and can, broadly speaking, 
be grouped into two branches: (a) confessions and (b) lie detection. The first branch 
mainly focuses on factors that elicit true and false confessions and factors that make 
people more (or less) susceptible to interrogative pressure (Lassiter & Meissner, 2010). 
The laboratory based research on confession typically employs one of two experimental 
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set-ups. The first of these is the Kassin and Kiechel (1996) crashed-computer paradigm in 
which participants were accused of pressing a forbidden key (i.e., the ALT key) during a 
typing task. No participant actually pressed the ALT key and all participants initially deny 
having pressed it. However, the results show that the most intense interview conditions 
(high memory vulnerability and presenting false evidence) resulted in a 100% rate of 
exhibited compliance (i.e., a confession was signed), 65% rate of internalization (i.e., 
participants believed that the ALT key was pressed) and 35% rate of confabulation (i.e., 
false memories were generated; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). Although this experimental 
scenario was an important first step in examining confessions, it was designed to 
investigate false confessions only. To evaluate the diagnostic features of confessions (i.e., 
both true and false), Russano and her colleagues (2005) introduced a guilt-innocence 
manipulation. Participants were instructed to solve a series of logic problems designated 
to be solved either individually or in teams (i.e., with a confederate). In the guilty 
condition, the confederate asked the participant for help with a problem designated as 
individual. If the participant chose to comply with the request (i.e., to break the rules of 
the study), s/he was considered to be guilty of cheating. No such requests were made for 
the innocent condition. The participants were then interviewed and asked to sign a 
confession statement. The overall results showed that an inquisitorial approach (e.g., 
explaining the seriousness of the offence and emphasizing honesty and truth) produced 
fewer false confessions and increased true confessions when compared to an accusatorial 
approach (e.g., minimizing or maximizing the seriousness of the offence; Lassiter & 
Meissner, 2010). In sum, the research shows that information-gathering approaches 
generally result in fewer false confessions than accusatorial approaches (Meissner, 
Redlich, Bhatt & Brandon, 2012). 
 
The second of these branches typically employs an experimental set-up that examines 
truth and deceit. The majority of this research involves participants viewing short 
videotaped statements showing individuals either lying or telling the truth. The observers 
are then asked to make a veracity judgment of the person in the video. Typically, results 
are just slightly better than chance (i.e., approx. 54% correct judgments) when observers 
try to discriminate between lies and truth (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Research has shown 
that people generally rely on the correct cues to detect deception, but that those cues are 
subtle and difficult to notice (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). Hence, Vrij and Granhag (2012) 
have called for new ways of developing and evaluating interview techniques (e.g., 
increasing cognitive load, Strategic Use of Evidence) that would yield more diagnostic 
cues to deceit. In these studies, participants are typically assigned the role of performing 
either a mock criminal or non-criminal act and are subsequently interviewed. For example, 
in a study by Granhag and colleagues (2013), the participants were instructed to visit a 
bookstore and either steal a specific book (guilty condition) or find out the price of that 
book (innocent condition). Once the participants returned from the bookstore, they were 
interviewed with one of three interview techniques. The techniques differed only with 
respect to the moment when evidence was presented to the suspects (i.e., evidence 
presented early, late or incrementally). The results showed that presenting evidence early 
produced the smallest difference between liars and truth-tellers and that an incremental 
presentation of evidence produced the largest difference (Granhag, Strömwall, Willén & 
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Hartwig, 2013). Overall, researchers in this area aim to develop interview protocols which 
may enhance and elicit cues to deceit and truthfulness from suspects who have committed 
a crime (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Kronkvist, 2006; Vrij & Granhag, 2012) or who 
are planning to commit one (Clemens, Granhag & Strömwall, 2011). The studies often 
use dependent measures that tap (a) the match between the suspects’ statement and 
evidence and (b) changes within the suspects own statements. When evaluating the 
collected information, the number of verbal cues to deceit (e.g., reference to place and 
time) is often mapped. For example, Vrij and his colleagues (2007) reasoned that, as the 
number of words in a suspect’s statement increases, so should the number of verbal cues 
to deceit/truthfulness. Their study showed that an accusatory interview style (i.e., 
indicating a higher degree of suspicion) had a negative effect on the length of suspects’ 
statements and on the number of verbal cues to deception found in the statements when 
compared to an information gathering interview style. 
 
Investigative interviewing. Until quite recently, the research field of suspect interviewing 
has primarily focused on anxiety-based interview approaches (Lassiter & Meissner, 2010; 
Vrij & Granhag, 2012). It has also been argued that, until quite recently, police officers 
tended to believe the main purpose of a suspect interview to be to elicit a confession (Bull, 
2014). Rather than attempting to obtain the suspect’s account of what had happened, the 
suspect was confronted with incriminating evidence and accusations (Bull, 2014). 
However, a number of high profile cases of miscarriages of justice in the UK (e.g., the 
Birmingham six) resulted in the creation of the Police And Criminal Evidence act (PACE; 
Home Office, 1985). With a focus on safeguarding innocent suspects, the PACE act 
developed into a nationwide interviewing standard, the five stage PEACE model of 
interviewing (Preparation and planning; Engage and explain; Account, clarification and 
challenge; Closure; Evaluation). The PEACE model has since been adopted in a number 
of other western countries (e.g., Australia, Norway,). Briefly explained, the model is a 
framework promoting ethical information gathering approaches as opposed to accusatorial 
tactics for extracting confessions. Consequently, in terms of interview techniques, the 
PEACE framework largely relies on Fisher and Geiselman’s (1992) the Cognitive 
Interview (Shawyer, Milne & Bull, 2013). 
 
In short, the cognitive interview (CI) draws on psychological research to enhance the 
memory retrieval of cooperative witnesses and victims. The elements of this technique 
relate to basic psychological processes such as cognition (e.g., context reinstatement & 
accuracy of responding), social dynamics (e.g., developing rapport & unburdening the 
victim) and communication (e.g., promoting extensive, detailed responses) (Fisher & 
Geiselman, 2010). Importantly, the CI has recently been adapted to be more compatible 
with the typical suspect interview leading to the development of the so-called cognitive 
interview for suspects (CIS). The CIS consists of eight stages: (1) building rapport, (2) 
asking for a narrative, (3) illustrating the story with a drawing, (4) follow-up questions, 
(5) reverse-order procedure, (6) challenging inconsistencies, (7) reviewing the interview 
with the suspect and (8) closure of the interview (Geiselman, 2012). The CIS has been 
shown to increase the interviewer’s ability to distinguish truth from deceit (Geiselman, 
2012). 
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It should be noted that, although the research conducted in accordance with the PEACE 
model has generated a body of literature on factors that may lead to false confessions, few 
studies have examined techniques that may result in true admissions and confessions 
(Meissner, Hartwig & Russano, 2010). 
 
A recent, notable example is that of Tekin and her colleagues (2015) who demonstrated 
novel tactics for eliciting admissions from guilty suspects by drawing on the strategic use 
of evidence framework (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). Briefly explained, one difference 
between guilty and innocent suspects is that the former tend to withhold critical details 
whereas the latter tend to be generally forthcoming. To exploit this difference, the 
interviewer can use existing evidence in a strategic fashion to gain truthful admissions. 
That is, before presenting a piece of evidence to the suspect, the interviewer poses 
questions to exhaust possible alternative explanations and makes the suspect address that 
piece of evidence. Subsequently, the interviewer confronts the suspect with the piece of 
evidence. This strategy increases the likelihood that guilty suspects provide statements 
inconsistent with the existing evidence (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). However, if this 
strategy is repeated for each piece of evidence, guilty suspects might become aware of the 
interviewer’s tactic (i.e., that the suspect is asked to address topics related to evidence 
already possessed by the interviewer). Hence, by strategically applying such an evidence-
confrontation procedure (i.e., influencing the suspect to expect the interviewer’s tactical 
pattern), Tekin and colleagues’ approach (2015) more successfully influenced guilty 
suspects to provide truthful admissions for evidence not held by the interviewer 
(compared to interview approaches that present evidence early on or not at all). 
Furthermore, the interviewer using the SUE confrontation was perceived as holding 
relatively more information about the critical phase of the crime and generated more 
statement-evidence inconsistencies when compared to the interviewer presenting evidence 
early on (Tekin et al., 2015). 
 
 
Emerging research on intelligence gathering 
To remedy the paucity of research on human intelligence gathering, Granhag, Vrij and 
Meissner (2014) edited a special issue of the journal Applied Cognitive Psychology. The 
issue covers several important research avenues such as experienced interviewers’ views 
of their own practices (Russano, Narchet, Kleinman & Meissner, 2014), suspects’ 
counter-interrogation strategies (Luke et al., 2014), field observations for establishing 
rapport (Goodman-Delahunty, Martschuk & Dhami, 2014) and memory enhancing 
techniques (Rivard, Fisher, Robertson & Hirn Mueller, 2014). Furthermore, important 
studies published before the special issue have organized interview techniques in 
taxonomies (Kelly, Miller, Redlich & Kleinman, 2013) and focused on systematic 
evaluations of real terrorist interviews (Alison, Alison, Noone, Elntib & Christiansen, 
2013). This research has great potential to provide practitioners with evidence-based 
strategies for conducting intelligence interviews (Fallon, 2014). 
 
Although researchers have recently started to examine techniques for collecting human 
intelligence, it is quite remarkable there are so few studies comparing the efficacy of 
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different techniques for interviewing not fully cooperative sources. To remedy this, Evans 
and her colleagues (2013) advanced the research on law enforcement interviewing. 
Drawing on the confession paradigm discussed earlier, Evans and colleagues (2013) made 
some alterations to better mirror a human intelligence gathering scenario. Briefly 
explained, a participant and a confederate were asked to answer a number of questions 
together in a trivia challenge. In the guilty condition, the confederate cheated on the test 
whereas, in the innocent condition, the confederate did not cheat. After completing the 
questions, the participant was accused of cheating. Two different interview protocols were 
tested. The accusatorial interview was designed to exploit participants’ anxiety and 
downplay the consequences of admitting to the crime. In contrast, the information-
gathering interview was designed to be cognitively challenging and increase the number 
of details recalled. The results showed that the information gathering approach was better 
for collecting relevant details and making suspects more talkative. This approach resulted 
in more admissions than the accusatorial approach. In addition, it was found that suspects 
interviewed with the accusatorial (vs. information gathering) approach were assessed (by 
observers blind to the conditions) to be more nervous and more pressured during the 
interviews. More recently, Evans and colleagues (2014) used this paradigm to compare 
three of the interview techniques described in the US Army Field Manual (US Army, 
2006), considered to be the gold standard for intelligence interviewing in the United 
States (Obama, 2009). The direct approach (an approach consisting of open-ended and 
specific questions posed in a business-like manner) was used as a comparison technique 
for evaluating the efficacy of techniques aimed to induce positive or negative emotions in 
sources. The results showed that the emotional approaches resulted in more relevant 
information than the direct approach. Furthermore, the positive emotions (vs. the negative 
emotions) approach reduced anxiety while promoting a supportive interaction. Finally, 
guilty suspects (i.e., suspects holding guilty knowledge) experienced higher arousal than 
innocent suspects when interviewed with an emotional approach. 
 
In summary, the research discussed thus far fits well within the framework advocated by 
the PEACE model. Research on suspect interviewing has, so far, mainly focused on false 
and true confessions and admissions, as well as techniques to distinguish liars from truth-
tellers. With respect to techniques aimed at gathering human intelligence, the research on 
law enforcement interviewing relies, to a large extent, on the cognitive interview, a 
technique constructed primarily for sources willing to cooperate. Turning to research that 
more directly investigates intelligence gathering, the majority of these studies concern (i) 
methods to establish and facilitate communication (e.g., rapport-building), (ii) the 
exploration of practitioners’ experiences and (iii) sources’ resistance behaviors. Hence, 
there is a lack of research on the comparative efficacy of techniques for gathering human 
intelligence. The notable exception (Evans et al., 2013) focuses on suspect interviewing 
and thus revolves around gathering guilty knowledge about a singular crime. 
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Towards a Psychological Framework for the Scharff Technique 
 
In Toliver’s (1997) biography on Hanns Scharff, Scharff describes his technique in a 
rather elaborate fashion, claiming that each element of the technique was designed to 
serve a particular purpose. Briefly explained, when working at the evaluation center 
Dulag Luft, Scharff viewed the standard interview procedure as rather ineffective. 
Consequently, Scharff started to imagine himself in the position of an allied prisoner and 
how he, in that role, would prepare for the interview. Having identified his prisoners’ 
typical behavior, Scharff tailored specific tactics to counteract those behaviors (Granhag, 
2010). In essence, Scharff developed a technique that rested upon taking the perspective 
of the source. 
 
 
Perspective taking 
Perspective taking is the cognitive capacity to consider the world from another person’s 
viewpoint, which facilitates an anticipation of other people’s behavior and reactions 
(Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin & White, 2008). Psychological research shows that taking the 
perspective of others is predictive of success in negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2008; 
Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001) and that it is of importance for interviewers (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2008; Justice et al., 2010; Soufan, 2011; Thagard, 1992). Granhag and Hartwig 
(2008) argued that interviewers in a law enforcement context might be too occupied with 
their own strategies and tactics and might, therefore, neglect the suspects’ strategies. 
Furthermore, Granhag and Hartwig (2008) reasoned that it is possible interviewers might 
risk falling prey to a false consensus effect if they adopt the suspect’s perspective. That is, 
interviewers might use their own mental states as the point of reference when considering 
what strategies and tactics would make the suspect more compliant. For example, a police 
officer might reason that if s/he were in the situation of the suspect, s/he would surely 
confess when confronted with all the evidence pointing to his/her guilt. Importantly, even 
though most people’s intuitive ability to adopt another’s perspective is limited (Davis, 
Conklin, Smith & Luce, 1996), the ability to use perspective-taking effectively can be 
improved with simple instruction (Galinsky et al., 2008; Idson et al., 2004). Furthermore, 
the research program on the strategic use of evidence (SUE) technique has provided 
empirical support for the premise that the understanding of suspects’ counter-interrogation 
strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 2015) can be translated into effective interview 
tactics (Clemens et al., 2011; Granhag, Mac Giolla, Strömwall & Rangmar, 2013; 
Granhag, Strömwall et al., 2013). Granhag (2010) argued that Scharff used perspective 
taking to identify and exploit the counter-interrogation strategies adopted by his prisoners 
to withstand the interview. In brief, it is not unreasonable to say that perspective taking is 
at the core of the Scharff technique (Granhag, 2010). 
 
 
Counter-interrogation strategies 
Broadly speaking, a counter-interrogation strategy is an attempt to successfully withstand 
an interview and to appear credible and convincing (Clemens, 2013; Granhag, Hartwig, 
Mac Giolla & Clemens, 2015). For example, liars may attempt to control their behavior 
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when they believe someone is assessing their veracity (Burgoon, Buller, Floyd & 
Grandpre, 1996). Turning to the literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism, some 
extremist organizations have developed manuals instructing members how to avoid 
revealing information during detention (e.g., Al Qaeda Manchester Manual and the Irish 
Republican Army’s green book). Hence, in an intelligence gathering context, the above 
definition of counter interrogation strategies might benefit from some clarification. 
Specifically, withstanding an intelligence interview refers to the use of deliberate 
strategies to resist cooperating, whereas appearing to be convincing refers to acting 
cooperative while providing information that does not advance the interviewer’s 
knowledge (see also, Alison et al., 2014b). By studying the literature on Hanns Scharff, 
three counter-interrogation strategies have been identified (Scharff, 1950; Toliver, 1997): 
(i) “I will not tell very much during the interview”; (ii) “I will try to figure out what they 
are after and then make sure not to give them what they want”; (iii) “It is meaningless to 
deny or hold back what they already know”. Importantly, the counter-interrogation 
strategies identified by Hanns Scharff are far from outdated (Alison et al., 2014b). 
Specifically, by analyzing the information revealed by modern terrorist suspects, Alison 
and his colleagues (2014b) categorized counter-interrogation strategies into five different 
tactics: (1) passive (e.g., remaining silent), (2) passive verbal (e.g., monosyllabic 
responses), (3) verbal (e.g., providing well known information), (4) retraction of previous 
statements and (5) no-comment. 
 
 
The tactics used by Hanns Scharff 
The purpose of Scharff’s tactics was to counteract the counter-interrogation strategies 
adopted by his prisoners. The first of Scharff’s tactics was to maintain a friendly approach. 
In contrast to many of his colleagues, Scharff avoided physical or coercive methods and 
became known for his equality-oriented and conversational approach. The second tactic 
was not pressing for information. Rather than demanding the prisoner answer questions, 
Scharff would tell stories, related in such a fashion as to encourage conversation. The 
third tactic was to build an illusion of knowing it all. Scharff would often open the 
interview by telling a detailed story that demonstrated his knowledge (Toliver, 1997). 
This tactic made it very clear that he already held a large amount of correct and detailed 
information. The fourth tactic was confirmation/disconfirmation. Instead of asking direct 
questions, Scharff presented claims that he wanted to have confirmed or disconfirmed by 
the prisoners. The fifth tactic was to ignore new information. When provided with critical 
information, Scharff would downplay it as unimportant or already known, hiding the fact 
that the information was of interest to him (Toliver, 1997). All five of these tactics will be 
described in more detail below. 
 
The Scharff tactics can be combined to counteract the counter-interrogation strategies 
adopted by a source (Granhag, 2010). For example, by avoiding asking explicit questions 
and applying the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic, Scharff was able to counteract his 
prisoners’ strategy of not saying very much. By not pressing the source to reveal 
information, Scharff was able to counteract his prisoners’ strategy of trying to figure out 
what he was after. Furthermore, by painting the knowing-it-all illusion, Scharff was able 
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to take advantage of the prisoners’ strategy of not holding back what they believed 
Scharff to already know. That is, the knowing-it-all story was used to open up the 
conversation and Scharff could then elicit new pieces of information by using the 
confirmation/disconfirmation tactic. 
 
 
Conceptualizing the Scharff Technique 
 
Scharff’s most consistently cited attribute was his ability to appear as if he was already 
familiar with all information of value. He achieved this by citing apparently relevant and 
detailed information to his prisoner. However, there is much more to the Scharff 
technique than merely giving the impression of being knowledgeable. Arguably, in order 
to fully understand the Scharff technique, one should consider not only the purpose of 
each tactic of the technique, but also the connections that exist between these tactics. 
 
 
Friendly approach 
Scharff became known for his friendly and conversational approach (Toliver, 1997). 
Many of his former prisoners remembered him as a gentleman who spoke polished 
English and was well versed in the nuances of both British and American customs. In 
accordance with rapport building (Alison et al., 2013), the friendly approach could be 
described as an atmosphere in which a source feels relaxed and comfortable. Just as 
clinical psychologists describe rapport as a therapeutic alliance (a personal bond between 
therapist and client that can lead to an improvement in clients’ psychological well-being), 
rapport within a human intelligence context can be described as the relationship between 
the interviewer and source, where a positive relationship is considered critical for 
motivating the source’s cooperation (Abbe & Brandon, 2014; Vallano & Schreiber 
Compo, 2015). Importantly, in order to achieve cooperation, not just compliance, research 
has highlighted the importance of building trust (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Trust is even 
more important for achieving cooperation when there is a relatively high degree of 
conflicting interests (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013) and trustworthiness is predicted by the 
display of positive traits such as ability (e.g., knowing your source and topic), 
benevolence (e.g., seeing the source rather than illegal activity) and integrity (e.g., being 
clear on rights and regulations even if negative) (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). 
Additionally, in order to establish a friendly atmosphere in an interview context, research 
has highlighted the importance of expressing understanding for the source’s situation, 
displaying acceptance and adopting adaptive interpersonal behavior (Alison et al., 2013). 
 
 
Not pressing for information 
Many of Scharff’s prisoners told that they had expected to be on the receiving end of 
endless and detailed questions (Toliver, 1997). But instead of asking questions, Scharff 
told long stories related in a fashion that offered his prisoners the opportunity, 
encouragement even, to add details or correct apparent errors. Simply put, this tactic is 
about evoking information rather than demanding it. Instead of asking for information 
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directly, an interviewer using the Scharff technique creates the circumstances in which a 
source has the opportunity to add details (to the illusion of knowing-it-all story) and 
respond to claims (confirmation/disconfirmation tactic). Furthermore, current research on 
intelligence gathering indicates that cooperation is stimulated through autonomy and 
intrinsic motivation (Alison et al., 2013). Alison and his colleagues (2015) argued that the 
source’s internal conflict (i.e., balancing whether or not to reveal information) is key to 
his/her cooperation. Allowing autonomy and showing respect increases this inner conflict 
by inducing ambivalence (e.g., the interviewer is treating me better than I expected, 
maybe s/he is not as bad as I have been told), which can lead sources to infer it as positive 
to cooperate. In direct contrast, pressing unwilling sources to reveal information might 
reinforce out-group identities (i.e., highlighting positive aspects of the terrorist 
organization while downplaying positive aspects of the interviewer), which may result in 
increased resistance (Alison, Giles & McGuire, 2015). Similarly, if it becomes obvious 
that the interviewer is driving an agenda (to establish rapport, trust etc.), this could 
distance sources rather than create a communicative bond and even influence them to shut 
down completely (Alison et al., 2014a). Thus, an interviewer whose feelings are perceived 
as dishonest is more likely to be met with silence or compliance than cooperation. On a 
different note, one effect that might result from this tactic is better masked information 
objectives. That is, as the interviewer refrains from posing explicit questions, the source 
will have a difficult time understanding what information the interviewer wants to collect. 
 
 
The illusion of knowing it all 
Scharff often opened the interaction by stating it was unlikely the source could offer any 
new information beyond what he already knew. He then told a long and detailed story that 
made it utterly clear he was indeed well informed on the topic (Toliver, 1997). Broadly 
speaking, this tactic is about making it clear that the interviewer is knowledgeable about 
the situation and the topic. To convince a source this is true, the interviewer’s knowledge 
has to be demonstrated by presenting a detailed and credible story. It is important to note 
that this knowing-it-all story has two main objectives. The first is to influence the source 
to provide information beyond the interviewer’s knowledge. The second is to build an 
illusion of being more knowledgeable than one actually is. Put differently, the objective is 
to make the source believe the interviewer holds information beyond what s/he has told. 
Both of these objectives will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
First, the knowing-it-all story might direct a source towards providing new, rather than 
already known, information. That is, if the story is told in the friendly atmosphere 
described above, the storytelling might influence the source to maintain his/her 
willingness to cooperate while leaving him/her with fewer options with respect to what to 
tell. From a theoretical perspective, this story could initiate the so-called cooperative 
principle (Grice, 1970). That is, if the interviewer starts the interview by making it clear 
that s/he will present the already known information to the source, the interaction might 
fall rather closely to the social guidelines of a normal conversation. Explained on a 
conceptual level, the source is likely to have considered how many and which pieces of 
information s/he is willing to reveal during the upcoming interview (e.g., information 
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units A, B and C). During the interview, the interviewer attempts to build the illusion of 
knowing it all by telling the source some of the information that is already known (e.g., 
information units A, B and D). If the source wants to contribute new information, s/he 
must adjust which information units to reveal by excluding the information presented by 
the interviewer (in this case, information units A and B). Then, the source must add other 
units of information in order to come across as helpful (e.g., information units C, E and F). 
In sum, the knowing-it-all tactic might influence the source to revise his/her initial plan 
and to provide additional (new) information. 
 
Second, the knowing-it-all story might result in the illusion that the interviewer holds 
information beyond what was told. That is, the knowing-it-all story could influence the 
source to draw incorrect inferences (e.g., if the interviewer already knows information 
units A and C, s/he must also know B). Drawing on research on the curse of knowledge 
(Birch & Bloom, 2007; Camerer, Loewenstein & Weber, 1989), this psychological bias 
tells that a person’s knowledge of the outcome of an event can color his/her judgment of 
other peoples’ beliefs about the same event (so called false-beliefs). Furthermore, the 
strength of this curse may be increased if anchored in a perceived plausible rationale 
(Birch & Bloom, 2007). In the experiment conducted by Birch and Bloom (2007), 
participants saw a girl surrounded by four different colored boxes. The girl placed a violin 
in the blue box to her right and exited the room. After the girl left, the participants were 
told that the violin had been moved to another box and the boxes themselves rearranged. 
Participants who received minimal information were told simply that the violin had been 
moved to another box. Participants who received implausible information (i.e., indicating 
unlikeliness the girl would find the violin) were told that the violin had been moved to a 
different colored box placed at a different location. Participants in both these conditions 
believed that the girl would look for the violin in the blue box upon her return. Thus, their 
knowledge about the location of the violin (i.e., that it was moved) did not affect their 
prediction of the girl’s behavior. However, participants who received plausible 
information (i.e., indicating likeliness the girl would find the violin) were told that the 
violin was put in a red box now replacing the blue box to the girl’s right. These 
participants believed that the girl would look in the red box rather than the blue. Thus, the 
participants’ knowledge of the violin’s location influenced their prediction about the girl’s 
behavior. Arguably, the effect found in this experiment translates quite well to how an 
illusion can be established when presenting the knowing-it-all story. First, as sources hold 
information that the interviewer does not, sources are susceptible to be cursed by their 
own knowledge. Second, compared to an interviewer who does not share information, one 
who does will add to the plausibility that s/he also holds additional relevant information 
beyond what was presented. 
 
 
Confirmation/disconfirmation 
Instead of asking direct questions, Scharff often presented claims (Granhag, 2010; Toliver, 
1997). That is, Scharff would systematically present claims (for which he already knew 
the correct answer) to the prisoner. Occasionally, however, Scharff would make a claim 
for which he did not hold the correct answer. In order to explain the confirmation/ 
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disconfirmation tactic, one could consider a situation where there is intelligence pointing 
in two different directions. For example, there will be a terrorist attack in either 
Manchester or London. Assume there is more reliable information pointing towards 
London than Manchester. An interviewer who wants to elicit information from a source 
who possibly holds knowledge of the location of the attack has a number of different 
options. The key to this tactic is to avoid asking an explicit question and instead make a 
claim. That is, the interviewer can either claim what s/he considers to be the most 
probable alternative (e.g., “So, we know that London is the target!”) and note whether the 
source disconfirms or confirms, or the interviewer could claim what s/he considers to be 
the less probable alternative (e.g., “So, we know that Manchester is the target!”) and note 
whether the source disconfirms or confirms. The advantage of using claims is that the 
source might be more willing to respond to these than explicit questions as dis/confirming 
claims can be perceived as a less active form of compliance. From the perspective of the 
source, confirming a claim might be viewed as “I only confirmed what they already knew,” 
and disconfirming might be viewed as “I only told them they were off target.” 
 
 
Ignore new information 
When a prisoner provided a critical piece of information, Scharff’s reaction was to 
downplay it as irrelevant, unimportant or already known. He would sometimes even 
appear to completely ignore the answer by overtly changing the subject to a different, 
often more trivial one (Toliver, 1997). The main purpose of this tactic was to mask the 
fact that the information revealed by the source was indeed of interest to him. It is 
important to note that this thesis employs a less explicit strategy for ignoring new 
information than Scharff’s. Rather than downplaying the value of critical information, the 
conceptualization presented in this thesis masks information value by treating all 
information as equal. 
 
 
The Scharff Model 
 
Inspired by the strategic use of evidence (SUE) model (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015), I here 
propose a model of the Scharff technique. This model is an attempt to illuminate the main 
psychological features behind the Scharff technique and, in particular, clarify how the 
different tactics can be used to influence a source’s perception of the interviewer’s 
knowledge. It is important to note that this model should not be considered complete; the 
aim is to broadly describe how Scharff’s tactics can influence general principles (e.g., the 
source’s perception of the interviewer’s knowledge and information objectives) and how 
this, subsequently, may affect the source’s counter-interrogation strategies and verbal 
responses. 
 
 
Theoretical underpinnings 
The Scharff model is underpinned by the assumption that sources adopt behaviors to 
withstand the interview (Granhag, 2010; Scharff, 1950; Toliver, 1997), also referred to as 
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counter-interrogation strategies (Alison et al., 2014b; Clemens, 2013; Granhag, Hartwig et 
al., 2015). A source interviewed for intelligence gathering purposes will likely attempt to 
balance an internal dilemma: what information to reveal and what information to withhold 
(Alison, Giles & McGuire, 2015). For this thesis, this dilemma was framed as an 
information management problem. The participants (taking on the role of sources) had 
agreed to trade information in exchange for the interviewer’s assistance but did not want 
to reveal too much information as they sympathized with the terrorist group (that is, the 
group about which they were revealing information) and feared retaliation from the group. 
In essence, to withstand the interview, the sources had to strike a balance between (a) not 
revealing too much information and (b) not revealing too little information. 
 
Counter-interrogation strategies are closely linked to the psychological theory of self-
regulation (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 2015). The theory of self-regulation is a social 
cognitive framework for understanding how people achieve their goals and, specifically, 
how people control behavior to steer towards desired outcomes and away from undesired 
outcomes (Carver & Scheier, 2012). Much self-regulatory behavior occurs automatically 
without awareness or conscious thought (Aarts, Gollwitzer & Hassin, 2004), but some 
situations demand conscious and active intervention to regulate behavior. Self-regulatory 
behavior has been shown to be a dominating force when there is a perceived threat with 
negative consequences and especially so if one lacks knowledge about the forthcoming 
aversive event (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). For intelligence contexts, the source is likely to 
perceive an interaction with the authorities as a threat. Furthermore, not knowing what 
and how much information the authorities already know may add to the perceived threat. 
Accordingly, sources are likely to formulate goals, plan how to fulfill the goals, adopt 
self-regulatory strategies to reach the goals and then monitor whether the goals are 
achieved (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). Self-regulatory behavior is thus mirrored in the 
information management dilemma that sources often have to navigate, reveal enough 
information to fulfill a desired outcome (e.g., receive assistance from the interviewer) but 
not too much or too little information so as to avoid undesired outcomes (e.g., face 
retaliations from a terrorist group). 
 
To regain perceived control in the interview setting, a source may use different types of 
control methods. The method of particular relevance for understanding counter-
interrogation strategies is cognitive control, specifically information control and decision 
control (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). Information control refers to the control achieved 
after obtaining information about the aversive event. In the interview setting, the 
information control would translate to trying to predict what will happen during the 
interview, for example, estimating the amount of information already held by the 
interviewer and how much pressure the interviewer will apply to get the information that 
s/he wants. Decision control refers to the control achieved after having decided how to act 
during the upcoming event. In an interview setting, decision control would translate to 
deciding how to act after the interviewer’s information interests have been estimated. 
Consequently, sources might adopt a number of self-regulatory behaviors with the 
common objective being to regain control. These behaviors can be categorized as either 
avoidance strategies or escape strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; cf. Taylor, 2014). 
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Avoidance strategies concern behavior that aims to evade confrontation with threatening 
stimuli. Avoidant behavior could be mirrored in a source’s aiming to work around the 
issue by revealing information already known to the interviewer, or by trying to avoid 
providing information that satisfies the interviewer’s objectives. Escape strategies concern 
behavior that aims to terminate a direct threat. Escape behavior could be mirrored in a 
source’s direct refusal to cooperate by staying silent or retracting previous statements 
(Alison et al., 2014b). 
 
 
Principles of the Scharff model 
The Scharff technique is based on influencing a source’s perceptions of the information 
held by the interviewer and the technique draws on four general principles (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2015). The four general principles underlying the Scharff technique are outlined 
below. Three of these principles are directly related to the source: (1) the source’s 
perception of the interviewer’s knowledge and information interests, (2) the source’s 
counter-interrogation strategy and (3) the source’s verbal response. The fourth principle 
relates to the interviewer: (4) perspective taking. 
 
The first principle concerns the source’s perception of the interviewer’s knowledge and 
information interests. Sources are likely to predict (a) what and how much information the 
interviewer already holds and (b) which pieces of information the interviewer wants to 
collect. An estimation of the interviewer’s knowledge can be more and less calibrated, 
meaning that the source might over or underestimate the interviewer’s knowledge. Also, 
the interviewer’s information objectives can be more or less difficult to figure out, leading 
the sources to be more or less correct when assessing which pieces of information the 
interviewer aims to collect. Critically, the source’s perception of the interviewer’s 
knowledge and objectives can be altered as a function of the Scharff tactics employed by 
the interviewer (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. A model of the Scharff technique. 
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The second principle concerns the source’s counter-interrogation strategies. The basic 
assumption is that sources have some degree of willingness to cooperate but are only 
willing to provide a portion of the information they hold. Another premise is that many 
sources will adopt strategies to convince the interviewer that they hold less information 
than they actually do. Consequently, sources will use avoidant strategies with respect to 
providing critical information. This can be accomplished by adopting strategies such as 
being conservative with new (to the interviewer) information but willing to discuss 
common knowledge and/or unrelated topics (Alison et al., 2014b). However, if sources 
are deprived of the avoidance alternative, they will turn to escape responses. For example, 
if approached with coercive tactics, the source is likely to terminate the communication by 
denying that s/he holds any information or retracting previously provided information 
(Alison et al., 2014b). 
 
The third principle concerns the source’s verbal responses. His/her verbal responses are 
the basis for evaluating the outcome of the interview, for example, the total amount of 
information revealed by the source and the quality of the information collected. 
Evaluating the outcome of an intelligence gathering interview will be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
The fourth principle concerns perspective taking by the interviewer. As has been 
discussed, perspective taking is the capacity to consider the world from another’s 
viewpoint. This then allows the interviewer to anticipate a source’s reactions and behavior 
(Galinsky et al., 2008). By imagining him/herself in the source’s position, the interviewer 
can attempt to (1) read the source’s perception of the interviewer’s knowledge and 
information objectives, (2) predict the source’s counter-interrogation strategies and (3) 
predict the verbal response that is likely to follow (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; see also, 
Thagard, 1992). 
 
The relation between these four general principles is at the heart of the Scharff technique. 
That is, the perception of the interviewer will guide the source’s choice of counter-
interrogation strategies and the adopted strategy will affect his or her verbal response 
(Figure 1). By making use of perspective taking, the interviewer will put him/herself in a 
better position to employ tactics to counteract the source’s behavior (Granhag, 2010; 
Scharff, 1950; Toliver, 1997). Illustrated by an example, consider a source who adopts the 
strategy of revealing minimal information, but who must show some signs of cooperation 
in order to receive a favor. The interviewer begins the interview by painting the knowing-
it-all illusion without pressing for information. The knowing-it-all story might affect the 
source’s perception of the interviewer’s knowledge (“S/he knows much more than I 
thought!”) resulting in the source being required to provide information beyond what the 
interviewer just told (to show signs of cooperation). Subsequently, as the source’s 
perception is affected, the source might adopt a different strategy (“I have to figure out 
what information s/he wants so I don’t provide anything critical”). As the interviewer 
avoids asking questions, the source might adjust his/her strategy (“I can’t figure out what 
they are after. I better only bring up information they already know”). By only reacting to 
claims presented by the interviewer (e.g., “Yes, that’s correct” or “No, that’s incorrect”), 
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the source is kept under the impression that s/he is only providing already known 
information. Ideally, the Scharff tactics can be used to elicit reliable information from a 
source without pointing to the interviewer’s interest in that information. 
 
 
Introducing an Experimental Paradigm and Measures of Efficacy 
 
As there is a paucity of research on the comparative efficacy of intelligence gathering 
techniques, one goal of this thesis is to develop and make use of an experimental set-up 
which mirrors some of the more important features of a typical human intelligence 
interaction. In brief, the experimental set-up was characterized by four trademarks. First, 
the interviewer already held some intelligence about a possible future crime (for this 
thesis, plans to bomb a shopping mall). Second, as there were important gaps in the 
intelligence on this threat, the interviewer was obliged to seek information from an 
outside human source. Third, the source held knowledge that could fill some, but not all, 
of the gaps in the already existing intelligence. Fourth, the source was placed in an 
information management dilemma. Specifically, the source was motivated to talk to the 
interviewer (if the source talked, s/he would receive help to flee the country) but was 
unwilling to share a substantial amount of information (the source was to imagine s/he 
had rather strong social ties to the terrorist group). That is, the source was placed in a 
position where it was necessary to strike a balance between not revealing too much nor 
too little information. This dilemma was inspired by research showing that sources often 
have divided loyalties or work on a quid pro quo basis (Herbig, 2008; Kramer & Heuer, 
2007; Shumate & Borum, 2006). 
 
 
Measures of efficacy 
Studying techniques for eliciting human intelligence requires a paradigm which is rather 
different from the typical paradigm used for studying techniques for collecting 
information from eyewitnesses and techniques used for interviewing suspects. First, for 
the typical eyewitness study, sources are cooperative and the techniques are evaluated in 
terms of the witnesses’ memory performance, for example, the extent to which the 
technique can increase the correct and decrease the incorrect details recalled (Memon, 
Meissner & Fraser, 2010). Second, studies on suspect interviews typically aim to secure 
true confessions or admissions (while avoiding false confessions) or to discriminate 
between liars and truth tellers (e.g., Lassiter & Meissner, 2010; Vrij et al., 2007). Broadly 
speaking, the aim is typically to evaluate techniques with respect to their efficacy in 
collecting information relevant to the suspect’s guilt/innocence. In human intelligence 
situations, however, the source is not typically expected to provide an extensive statement. 
Furthermore, although sources might hold information that is more or less sensitive, the 
information is not necessarily self-incriminating. Assessing the efficacy of techniques 
aimed at eliciting such information is thus a relatively more complex task and the 
measures used for tapping the efficacy of such techniques has generally been overlooked. 
More specifically, there are two critical aspects that have been more or less neglected in 
prior research: evaluating the efficacy of techniques for interviewing sources who (a) hold 
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incomplete information on a topic and (b) are only prepared to share a portion of the 
information they hold. Hence, in assessing the efficacy of information elicitation 
techniques, one needs to consider not only the amount and reliability of the information 
collected during the actual interview, but also the source’s perception of and response to 
that particular exchange. For the studies on which this thesis is based, eight dependent 
measures were identified. 
 
 
Objective measures 
The objective measures refer to the information elicited during the interaction. These 
measures capture the efficacy of the technique by examining the quantity and quality of 
the information gathered. 
 
Total information. One of the more basic and straightforward measures for evaluating 
interview techniques is the total amount of information gathered. The total amount of 
information refers to everything that is mentioned during the interview. This measure 
captures the quantity of information and is less concerned with the precise value of the 
information. As intelligence gathering concerns basically any type of information 
(Hartwig et al., 2014), critical details are preferable to large amounts. Thus, the total 
amount of information gathered is not of major concern for this thesis. 
 
New information. As interviewers often hold some information on the topic under 
discussion, a relatively more important measure of efficacy is the objective amount of 
new (previously unknown) information elicited from the source. In most situations, the 
relationship is straightforward: the more new information elicited, the better the interview 
technique. However, it is easy to imagine exceptions to this rule. For example, in some 
situations, one might prefer a technique that is consistently successful at eliciting 
relatively few but highly valuable pieces of information (e.g., a name or a street address) 
over a technique that is effective at eliciting larger volumes of new, but less useful, 
information. Hence, the sheer amount of new information elicited does not necessarily 
automatically speak to the efficacy of an intelligence gathering technique.  
 
Quality of new information. All new pieces of information elicited are not of equal value. 
However, it is not always an easy task to decide which pieces of information are more, or 
less, important on a larger scale. The information could be immediately relevant or prove 
to be of critical importance at a later stage. That is, new information is often of potential 
value even though the timing of this value may vary. Assessing the quality of the new 
information gathered is complicated from an objective standpoint and even more complex 
from a subjective one (i.e., the intelligence agency, the interviewer and the source might 
all have different views of what is critical and what is not). Thus, although the quality of 
the information collected is critical when evaluating the efficacy of intelligence gathering 
techniques, this particular issue will not be examined in this thesis. 
 
Precision of new information. Memory research has shown that, in order to prevent 
inaccurate statements, people tend to provide answers at a level of generality that 
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corresponds with the certainty of their knowledge (Goldsmith, Koriat & Weinberg-
Eliezer, 2002). That is, people seem to prefer to provide answers that include details they 
believe to be correct. If the confidence for the correctness of a detail is low (i.e., if a 
person questions his/her own knowledge), the individual might prefer to not report that 
detail. Similarly, a source may provide statements at different levels of generality. 
However, this will depend on both the source’s confidence and willingness to provide 
information. That is, a source unwilling to volunteer information might be deliberately 
vague. Instead of not saying anything, the source can opt to reveal general and vague 
information. The source might claim, for example, that all s/he knows is that an attack 
will take place sometime in December while intentionally withholding more specific (i.e., 
around Christmas) or exact (i.e., December 27) information. In brief, more new 
information does not necessarily equal more precise information. In order to avoid 
revealing too much, a source can relate a relatively large amount of general information. It 
is thus important to consider the grain-size (or specificity) of the new pieces of 
information reported when evaluating human intelligence gathering techniques. 
 
 
Subjective measures 
The subjective measures refer to the source’s perception of the interview and these 
measures attempt to capture the source’s experience of and beliefs about the interaction. 
The perceived knowledge of the interviewer, the perception of what information s/he is 
after and the perceived amount of information revealed is critical considering that these 
perceptions will affect the interview on several levels. For example, the source’s 
perception of the interview can have immediate relevance (e.g., “What information does 
the interviewer already hold?”), may set the stage for following interviews (e.g., “Did I 
provide enough information to receive help in exchange?”) and influence how the source 
shares information (e.g., “If the interviewer already holds information unit A, there is no 
reason to avoid it”). In conclusion, the efficacy of a human intelligence gathering 
technique cannot be properly assessed without considering the source’s perception of the 
interaction. 
 
Perceived interviewer knowledge. For this thesis, this measure concerns the source’s 
perception of the amount of information possessed by the interviewer prior to the 
interview. There is no straightforward relation between this measure and the efficacy of 
an interview technique. For some situations, it may be effective to let the source believe 
the interviewer holds more information than is actually the case, whereas, for other 
situations, the opposite may hold true. For example, the perception of being interviewed 
by a very knowledgeable interviewer might influence the source to open up and share 
more information. It is reasonable to argue that a semi-cooperative source would 
generally prefer to reveal information closer to what the interviewer already knows. 
However, perceiving the interviewer as very knowledgeable could also make the source 
hesitant to provide details in fear of contributing the final piece of the puzzle. In 
conclusion, being perceived as knowledgeable relates to the illusion of the knowing it all 
tactic. Thus, this measure also works as a manipulation check for the knowing-it-all story 
of the Scharff technique. 
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Misperceived interviewer knowledge. Sources can be more or less correct when assessing 
an interviewer’s knowledge. This measure captures the accuracy of the source’s judgment 
with respect to which particular pieces of information are known/unknown to the 
interviewer. The rationale for including this measure is that a source might want to exploit 
the possibility of revealing already held (by the interviewer) information. By revealing 
known information, the source can claim that s/he is cooperative while deliberately 
finding ways to avoid providing new information. Revealing already known information 
is a common counter-interrogation strategy (Alison et al., 2014b; Soufan, 2011; Toliver, 
1997). Critically, this strategy will only work if the source correctly predicts what 
information the interviewer holds. If the source’s prediction is incorrect, s/he may 
unknowingly provide the interviewer with new information. Hence, this measure maps the 
extent to which the tactics (mainly storytelling) of the Scharff technique result in the 
source perceiving the interviewer to hold information that s/he, in fact, does not. 
 
Perceived interviewer information objectives. In a human intelligence interaction, it may 
be of importance to ensure the source is not alerted to the interviewer’s specific 
information interests. The reason for this is that such an understanding might increase the 
risk that the source withholds or fabricates statements concerning this particular 
information. An information elicitation technique is arguably more fundamentally sound 
if it does not reveal gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge. Thus, this measure aims at 
assessing how difficult it is for the source to understand what information the interviewer 
seeks to collect. 
 
Perceived amount of new information revealed. This measure concerns the source’s 
perception of how much new information s/he revealed during the interview. Broadly 
speaking, a technique is more effective if it leaves the source believing that s/he revealed 
very little (or no) new information when, in fact, the interviewer was able to elicit an 
extensive amount of new and useful information. This measure is crucial considering that 
information elicitation is characterized by the source unknowingly providing information 
(Justice et al., 2010). Furthermore, a source that believes s/he revealed no (or very little) 
new information might be more willing to talk to the interviewer again. This can be 
compared to a source under the impression that s/he (for one reason or another) provided 
too much information and, as a result, might likely be more guarded and less cooperative 
during subsequent engagements. 
 
 
Combining Measures 
All of the above measures can be analyzed independently, but some can also be combined. 
Arguably, one of the more informative measures of efficacy is obtained by relating: (a) 
the objective amount of new information gathered and (b) the source’s perception of the 
amount of new information revealed. An effective information elicitation technique 
should result in sources underestimating the amount of new information revealed. In brief, 
a source who (i) deliberately aims to reveal little information of value and (ii) is led to 
reveal new information unknowingly would provide more valuable information than s/he 
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deliberately aimed to. Another potential benefit is that the source might be more prepared 
to talk to the interviewer again. For example, a source who leaves the interview believing 
that s/he contributed very little new information might be more prepared to reveal more 
information in subsequent interactions.  
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SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
 
General and Specific Aims 
 
The legal-psychology literature has little to offer with respect to techniques aimed at 
eliciting intelligence from human sources. This is quite remarkable considering the 
prominent role of human intelligence gathering and the resurgent interest in collecting 
intelligence witnessed since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Although operational experience 
has given rise to a wide array of human intelligence gathering techniques, these have 
rarely been subjected to scientific evaluation (Justice et al., 2010). This thesis sets out to 
remedy this gap in the academic literature. Consistent with the recent call for evidence-
based evaluations of intelligence gathering techniques (Brandon, 2011), the studies 
included in this thesis had five general aims: (i) introduce the Scharff technique, (ii) 
provide a psychological framework for the technique, (iii) conceptualize the technique, 
(iv) introduce an experimental set-up mirroring some key aspects of a human intelligence 
gathering scenario and (v) develop relevant dependent measures to evaluate the efficacy 
of intelligence gathering techniques. The more specific aim was to conduct the first 
scientific examination of the Scharff technique. 
 
 
Table 1 
The progression of the three studies constituting this thesis 
 
 
Specifically, the aim of Study I was to validate and advance Granhag and his colleagues’ 
(2015) study on the Scharff technique. For example, the experimental paradigm was 
refined, the Scharff technique was conceptualized in a more proper manner and the 
dependent measures were more properly developed (see Table 1). For Study II, the 
ecological validity of three issues was increased: (i) the source and the interviewer met in 
person, (ii) the source was allowed to fabricate information during the interview and (iii) 
the direct approach was compared with two versions of the Scharff technique (Scharff 
confirmation [presenting claims that included correct alternatives only] and Scharff 
 
Study I Study II Study III 
Interaction Phone Face-to-face Face-to-face 
Information On paper From memory From memory 
Fabrications Not allowed Allowed Allowed 
Sources Received the same 
instructions 
Received the same  
instructions 
Received different 
instructions 
Claims Included only 
correct alternatives  
Included correct 
and incorrect 
alternatives 
Included only 
correct alternatives  
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dis/confirmation [presenting claims that included a mix of correct/incorrect alternatives]). 
For Study III, the ecological validity was increased by systematically varying the sources’ 
level of cooperation (i.e., more/less willing) and capability to provide information (i.e., 
more/less able). The three studies and resulting outcomes are briefly described below. 
 
 
Study I 
 
Study I examined the comparative efficacy of the Scharff technique and the direct 
approach. The direct approach (US Army, 2006) was chosen as the point of comparison 
due to its operational relevance; this approach has proven to be one of the most commonly 
used techniques in the United States (Redlich, Kelly & Miller, 2011). The direct approach 
consists of open-ended and specific questions and does not make use of leading questions. 
 
Sixty university students (37 women, 23 men) with the mean age of 26 were randomly 
allocated to two interview conditions. Each participant was instructed to take on the role 
of a source and received a coherent story holding incomplete information about a terrorist 
group planning an attack. The story contained 35 separate pieces of information. Thirteen 
of those were already known to the interviewer and 22 were unknown. The sources 
received no information on what information the interviewer already held. In addition, 
each source was instructed to be semi-cooperative during the interview by balancing an 
information management dilemma; some information had to be revealed (to assist the 
police and be allowed to leave the country), but revealing too much information would be 
detrimental (as the sources had rather strong social ties to the terrorist group). Importantly, 
the sources were not allowed to lie (i.e., fabricate information) during the interview. 
 
Each source made a phone call to the interviewer from a room at the department of 
psychology in Gothenburg. The phone conversations were taped in order to later score the 
objective amount of information revealed. The conversations lasted six minutes on 
average. All sources had access to the information in written form so there was no need to 
memorize anything. The Scharff condition started with the interviewer implementing the 
friendly approach tactic (e.g., showing awareness of the source’s situation) and explaining 
that he would start the interview by outlining what was already known about the situation. 
After presenting the known information (i.e., the tactic of creating a knowing-it-all 
illusion), the interviewer again acknowledged that he was aware of the source’s situation 
and had reserved time to listen to the source. The interviewer then asked an open-ended 
question. After the source’s response, the interviewer presented five claims that he sought 
to have confirmed/disconfirmed by the source. All five claims were always presented in 
the same order and contained the correct alternative for the sources to affirm. After the 
fifth claim, the interviewer asked a final open-ended question and then concluded the 
interview. 
 
The direct approach interview started with the interviewer stating, “Okay, shall we start 
talking about what we are supposed to talk about? As you surely can understand, I am 
very interested in what you have to tell me about this upcoming event.” This was directly 
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tied to the initial open-ended question. After the source responded, the interviewer went 
on to pose five specific questions. The questions concerned the same information and 
were presented in the same order as the claims in the Scharff condition. After the fifth 
specific question, the interviewer asked a final open-ended question and concluded the 
interview. Importantly, despite the different interviewing protocols, all interviews began 
and ended in an identical manner. 
 
After the interview, the sources filled out three sequentially presented questionnaires and 
were instructed to answer them truthfully. The first questionnaire contained one crucial 
question (How easy/difficult was it for you to understand what information the 
interviewer was seeking to obtain?). The second questionnaire consisted of a checklist 
containing all pieces of information available to the sources (i.e., 35 units). The sources 
were asked to mark the specific information they perceived themselves to have revealed 
during the interview. The third questionnaire contained the same checklist of 35 units of 
information. Here, the sources were asked to tick the information they believed to be 
known by the interviewer prior to the interview. 
 
The interviewers were trained to strictly (word for word) follow the interview protocols. 
Each interview was transcribed verbatim and coded in terms of the amount of information 
revealed by a source. A piece of information was scored as new if it was not known to the 
interviewer prior to the interview (range: 0–22). Furthermore, the interview was divided 
into three phases (initial open-ended questions, claims/specific questions and final open-
ended question) and the amount of new information revealed in each phase was scored. 
Importantly, each piece of new information was only counted once (i.e., in the phase it 
was first mentioned). The information revealed as a result of presenting claims was scored 
and counted only if the source clearly affirmed a confirmation (e.g., “yeah”). 
 
Broadly speaking, the following hypotheses are backed up by twofold reasoning. First, 
sources faced with the knowing-it-all story and who want to be perceived as willing to 
cooperate cannot simply repeat the information stated by the interviewer. Instead, they 
have to go beyond the story and provide additional (new) pieces of information. Second, 
sources faced with the Scharff technique are expected to come to believe that the 
interviewer holds information that s/he, in fact, does not. If these sources act on the “it is 
meaningless to withhold what they already know” counter-interrogation strategy, it may 
follow that they (unknowingly) reveal new information in the belief that the information 
is already known to the interviewer. In contrast, when answering explicit questions, the 
sources are free to report the information they had previously planned to share and this 
can be expected to be a mix of new information and information already held by the 
interviewer. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Sources in the Scharff condition would reveal more new information than 
the sources in the direct approach condition.  
Hypothesis 2: The new information revealed in the Scharff condition would hold a 
relatively higher degree of precision. 
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Hypothesis 3a: Sources in the Scharff condition would reveal relatively more new 
information after the initial open-ended question. 
Hypothesis 3b: Sources would reveal more new information as a result of responding to 
claims (Scharff technique) compared to direct questions (direct approach). 
Hypothesis 4a: The interviewer in the Scharff condition would be perceived as relatively 
more knowledgeable about the situation. 
Hypothesis 4b: Sources in the Scharff condition would have a relatively less clear 
understanding of what information the interviewer was after. 
Hypothesis 5: Sources in the Scharff condition would underestimate the amount of new 
information revealed. The sources in the Direct Approach condition would, in contrast, 
overestimate the amount of new information revealed. The rationale behind this prediction 
was the expectation that the Scharff tactics would result in the sources unknowingly 
providing new information. The sources interviewed with the direct approach were 
expected to share a mix of new and old information but estimate (almost) all of this 
information to be new to the interviewer. 
 
Results. In support of H1 and H2, the Scharff technique elicited relatively more, and more 
precise, new information. Moreover, the Scharff technique resulted in more new 
information as a result of the initial open-ended question (supporting H3a) and presenting 
claims elicited more new information than asking direct questions (supporting H3b). The 
sources interviewed with the Scharff technique perceived the interviewer to have been 
relatively more knowledgeable about the situation (supporting H4a) but did not find it 
relatively more difficult to understand what information the interviewer sought to collect. 
Thus, H4b found no support. Finally, the sources interviewed with the Scharff technique 
underestimated the amount of new information revealed. In contrast, the sources 
interviewed with the direct approach overestimated the amount of new information 
revealed (Figure 2). Thus, H5 was supported. 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the interaction effect for the subjective and objective 
scores of new information revealed for the two interview conditions. 
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Discussion. The Scharff technique resulted in more new information than the direct 
approach. This finding can be explained by considering the source’s information 
management dilemma. A source who needs to be perceived as willing to cooperate and is 
faced with the knowing-it-all story has to provide information beyond what has already 
been disclosed by the interviewer. Thus, information revealed by the source after having 
been presented with the knowing-it-all story is likely to be new to the interviewer. In 
contrast, an interviewer who poses explicit questions allows the source to provide a mix 
of new and already known information. Furthermore, a source who capitalizes on the 
opportunity to reveal already known information can pretend to be willing to cooperate, 
while only providing already known information. Importantly, however, such a strategy 
will only work if the source correctly predicts the interviewer’s knowledge. Critically, in 
this study, the sources in both interview conditions misperceived the interviewer’s 
knowledge to a similar extent. Thus, misperceiving the interviewer’s knowledge (i.e., an 
incorrect prediction of what information is new/old to the interviewer) cannot explain the 
fact that the Scharff technique resulted in relatively more new information. It is thus likely 
that only the first reason (i.e., sources had to go beyond the interviewer’s story) accounts 
for the Scharff technique’s superiority in gathering new information. 
 
The Scharff technique resulted in almost double the amount of new information revealed 
when sources answered the first open-ended question compared to the direct approach. 
This finding is attributed to the knowing-it-all tactic and provides further support for the 
reveal-beyond-what-is-known reasoning. For the second phase, claims were compared to 
specific questions. Again, the Scharff technique outperformed the direct approach. It 
should be noted that this result emerged despite the Scharff technique already resulting in 
double the amount of new information in the first phase. For the third and final phase, the 
direct approach resulted in relatively more new information. However, the overall 
superiority of the Scharff technique had already been established from the analysis of the 
first two phases. 
 
The level of precision was relatively higher for the new information obtained using the 
Scharff technique. The amount of new information revealed and the precision of that 
information was highly correlated indicating that the new information revealed in the 
Scharff condition also had relatively more actionable value. However, these two measures 
(i.e., quality and quantity) are easily confounded and the finding should thus be 
interpreted with caution (Evans & Fisher, 2011). Furthermore, as sources were not 
allowed to lie and had access to the information (in hardcopy form) during the interview, 
the average amount of misinformation (i.e., incorrect pieces of information) was very low 
(four pieces). 
 
The Scharff technique interviewer was perceived to be relatively more knowledgeable 
about the situation. Importantly, about a third of the information ascribed to the 
interviewer’s knowledge was information that was not, in fact, known to the interviewer. 
That the corresponding proportion was even larger for the direct approach interviewer is, 
in hindsight, unsurprising. That is, as the sources interviewed with the direct approach 
were given no indication of what information the interviewer actually held, their 
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assessments were largely ungrounded. Furthermore, the sources in both interview 
conditions found it to be quite easy to understand the interviewer’s information interests. 
However, as the claims were expected to mask the interviewer’s information objectives 
better than specific questions, this outcome is a bit difficult to explain. 
 
Finally, an effective information elicitation technique should lead a source to reveal new 
information unknowingly. For the Scharff technique, almost 90% of the sources 
underestimated their contribution of new information (see Figure 2). This finding was 
attributed specifically to the claims posed during the interview as these claims were 
highly successful in gathering new information. In contrast, the direct approach led 
sources to overestimate their contribution of new information. This finding indicates that 
answering direct questions generates the perception that most information revealed is new 
to the interviewer. 
 
 
Study II 
 
Study II drew on the experimental setup and measures used in Study I. Importantly, it 
advanced the previous study as pertains to three points. First, in place of phone interviews, 
sources and interviewers met in person. Second, sources were allowed to actively 
fabricate information during the interview. Third, the direct approach was compared with 
two versions of the Scharff technique: Scharff confirmation (presenting claims that 
included correct alternatives only) and Scharff disconfirmation/confirmation (presenting a 
mix of correct/incorrect claims). One hundred and nineteen adults (72 women, 47 men) 
with a mean age of 27 were randomly allocated to groups and interviewed using one of 
the three interview conditions.  
 
Similar to Study I, each participant took on the role of a semi-cooperative source holding 
incomplete information about an upcoming terrorist attack. In addition, sources were 
given the opportunity to fabricate information during the interview (with the risk of losing 
their compensation of €15 if caught lying). Prior to the interview, the sources completed a 
memory test asking about 15 key pieces of background information (e.g., at what time 
will the bomb explode?). An identical memory test was filled out immediately after the 
interview. To be included in the study, the participant had to achieve a minimum score of 
11 correct on both of these tests.  
 
The sources established contact with the interviewer by knocking on the interviewer’s 
door. The interviewer invited the source to take a seat and then started the interview. The 
interviewer and source were alone in the room during the interaction. The interviews 
lasted, on average, eight minutes. 
 
The two Scharff protocols started with the interviewer presenting the information already 
held by him/herself on the terrorist attack while maintaining a friendly approach. This was 
followed by an open-ended question. This question constituted the first phase of the 
interview. For the second phase, the interviewer presented three claims and, exclusively in 
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this phase, the two Scharff conditions differed. The Scharff confirmation condition 
presented three claims that included only correct alternatives (e.g., “We thought it a bit 
ironic that Nordstan is again the target…”). The claims in the Scharff 
disconfirmation/confirmation condition were identical to the claims in the Scharff 
confirmation condition with one exception; one of the three claims made included an 
incorrect alternative (e.g., “We thought it a bit ironic that NK is again the target…”). For 
the third phase, the interviewer asked a final open-ended question after which the 
interview was concluded. 
 
The direct approach condition was opened with a general invitation, “Okay, let’s start 
talking about what we are supposed to talk about. I have a few questions I would like you 
to answer. You can start by telling me what you know about the situation.” (i.e., phase 1). 
This was followed by three specific questions (asking for the same information as the 
claims made in the Scharff conditions) in phase 2. If a source did not answer a question, 
the question was repeated two times. Hence, sources could potentially be faced with as 
many as nine questions (three individual questions, each potentially asked a total of three 
times). When all questions had been asked, the interviewer asked a final open-ended 
question and concluded the interview.  
 
One man and one woman, both with acting experience, were trained as interviewers. The 
aim of the training was to ensure that they memorized the interview scripts verbatim and 
would refrain from improvising during the interviews. The interviewers had access to a 
small notebook to consult if they felt they were losing track of their lines from the 
interview script. 
 
After the interview, the sources filled out three questionnaires (similar to the 
questionnaires in Study I) and were instructed to answer truthfully. The interviews were 
transcribed verbatim and coded for new information revealed (range: 0–22). Furthermore, 
the interview was divided into three phases and the amount of new information revealed 
was scored for each phase (scoring only exclusive units as described in Study I). 
 
In line with previous reasoning behind the Scharff technique (outlined in Study I), the 
following hypotheses were formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Sources in both Scharff conditions would reveal more new information than 
sources in the direct approach. 
Hypothesis 2a: Sources in both Scharff conditions would reveal relatively more new 
information after the initial open-ended question. 
Hypothesis 2b: Posing claims would result in more new information compared to asking 
direct questions. 
Hypothesis 3: Sources in both Scharff conditions would fabricate information to a 
relatively lesser extent. The rational for this prediction is that it might be perceived as 
more likely to be caught in a lie when the interviewer is perceived as relatively more 
knowledgeable. 
Hypothesis 4a: The interviewer in both Scharff conditions would be perceived as 
relatively more knowledgeable about the situation. 
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Hypothesis 4b: Sources in both Scharff conditions would misperceive the interviewer’s 
knowledge to a relatively higher degree. 
 Hypothesis 4c: Sources in both Scharff conditions would have a relatively less clear 
understanding of what information the interviewer is after. 
Hypothesis 5: Sources in both Scharff conditions would underestimate their contribution 
of new information. The sources in the Direct Approach would overestimate their 
contribution of new information. 
 
Results. The Scharff confirmation condition resulted in more new information than the 
direct approach. Furthermore, the two Scharff versions combined outperformed the direct 
approach in terms of new information gathered. Thus, H1 was largely supported. In 
support of H2a, both Scharff versions elicited more new information than the direct 
approach after the initial open-ended question. Unexpectedly, the Scharff confirmation 
condition outperformed the Scharff disconfirmation/confirmation in this phase. No 
difference was found between posing claims and asking direct questions. Thus, H2b found 
no support. Most sources refrained from lying (overall, less than 3% of the new 
information was deceptive). Thus, inferential tests could not be performed and H3 could 
not be tested. The sources interviewed with the Scharff versions perceived the interviewer 
to be relatively more knowledgeable about the situation (supporting H4a). These sources 
also misperceived the interviewer’s knowledge to a relatively higher degree (i.e., an 
illusion was established thus supporting H4b). Furthermore, sources interviewed with the 
Scharff versions found it relatively more difficult to read the interviewer’s information 
objectives (supporting H4c). Finally, the Scharff versions resulted in sources 
underestimating their contribution of new information. When interviewed with the direct 
approach, sources overestimated their contribution of new information (Figure 3). Thus, 
H5 was supported. 
 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of the interaction effect for the subjective and objective 
scores of new information revealed for the three interview conditions. 
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Discussion. Generally speaking, the Scharff techniques outperformed the direct approach 
in gathering new information. Replicating the findings in Study I, both Scharff conditions 
resulted in relatively more new information after the initial open-ended question. It was 
surprising, however, that the Scharff confirmation condition outperformed the Scharff 
disconfirmation/confirmation condition for this phase. This finding is quite difficult to 
explain as the two Scharff conditions were identical up to that point. 
 
When comparing the techniques of making claims and specific questions, no difference in 
terms of amount of new information gathered was found between the techniques in this 
phase. Hence, the findings from Study I (that claims that included the correct alternative 
would result in more new information than asking specific questions) were not replicated. 
One explanation for this outcome is that the direct approach interviewer was more 
persistent in attempting to obtain information (when compared to Study I). That is, if a 
specific question was not answered appropriately (e.g., revealing a date when a date was 
asked for), the interviewer repeated the question twice. Furthermore, no clear difference 
was found when comparing confirmation with disconfirmation claims. In fact, the 
descriptive data showed the opposite pattern of what was expected. Correct claims 
resulted in more new information than incorrect claims. One plausible explanation for this 
result might be that it is easier to recognize memorized information (i.e., confirming a 
correct claim) than information not appearing in the material (disconfirming an incorrect 
claim). An additional explanation might be that disconfirmations are more effective with 
sources who are very cautious about revealing information. It is for future research to test 
under which circumstances disconfirmation might be relatively more effective for 
eliciting information. 
 
Most sources refrained from lying (only about 3% of the new information revealed was 
deceptive across all three conditions). The lies were so few that proper tests could not be 
conducted. The memory errors were even fewer (1% of all new information reported). 
 
Replicating the outcome of Study I, in both Scharff conditions, the interviewer was 
perceived to be relatively more knowledgeable about the situation. About a third of the 
information ascribed to the interviewer’s knowledge was information that was, in reality, 
not known to the interviewer prior to the interview. Furthermore, the Scharff tactics 
resulted in an illusion. That is, when comparing the Scharff conditions with the direct 
approach, the corresponding amount of misperceived information ascribed to the 
interviewer’s knowledge was lower for sources interviewed with the direct approach (this 
was not the case in Study I). Arguably, this illusion helps explain the finding that about 
20% of the new information was revealed unknowingly in both Scharff conditions. In 
both Scharff conditions, about 70% of the sources underestimated their contribution (see 
Figure 3). Furthermore, the sources in both Scharff conditions found it relatively more 
difficult to understand the interviewer’s information interests. The likely reason for this 
result is that no direct questions were asked and new information was ignored. These 
findings cut to the core of the Scharff technique: to elicit information without alarming 
sources of their contribution. In direct contrast, sources in the direct approach condition 
overestimated their contribution of new information. 
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Study III 
 
For Study III, the ecological validity was improved by systematically varying the sources’ 
level of cooperation (less wiling/more willing) and capability to provide information (less 
able/more able). The Scharff technique was compared with the direct approach. Two 
hundred adults (130 women, 70 men) with a mean age of 27 were randomly allocated into 
four categories, 50 participants in each category, 25 for each interview condition. The 
experimental setup and dependent measures were drawn from Studies I and II. 
 
To systematically vary the sources’ level of cooperation, the information management 
dilemma was manipulated (i.e., attempting to strike a balance between not revealing too 
much nor too little). The more willing sources were instructed to reveal quite a bit of 
information without revealing everything they knew. Their priority was to ensure they 
would receive help in exchange for information. The less willing sources were instructed 
to reveal only some information while not revealing too little. They were instructed to 
bring a negative attitude towards the police into the interview and their priority was to not 
sell out friends in the terrorist group. Hence, the instructions describe two different 
information management dilemmas: to reveal information but not say everything (more 
willing) and to reveal only a small amount of information but not stay completely silent 
(less willing). To systematically vary the sources’ capability to provide information, the 
amount of information they were given about the attack was manipulated. The more able 
sources received a background story consisting of 36 pieces of information. The less able 
sources received the same general story. However, this story consisted of only 24 pieces 
of information (i.e., 12 pieces fewer than found in the more complete story given to the 
more able sources). Importantly, the interviewer’s prior knowledge constituted 12 pieces 
of information, all 12 of which were included in the sources’ either 24 or 36 pieces of 
information. This resulted in the more able sources holding 24 pieces new to the 
interviewer and the less able sources holding 12 pieces new to the interviewer. In addition, 
the sources had the opportunity to lie and were required to complete pre and post 
interview memory tests to take part in the study (similar to Study II). 
 
Sources established contact with the interviewer by knocking on the interviewer’s door. 
The interviewer and source were alone in the room during the interaction. The interviews 
lasted, on average, six minutes. The Scharff protocol started with the interviewer 
presenting the illusion of knowing-it-all story while maintaining a friendly approach, 
followed by an open-ended question. After the source had finished talking, the interviewer 
presented three claims. The interview was concluded after a final open-ended question. 
The direct approach protocol began with an open-ended question. This was followed by 
three specific questions (asking for the same information as the claims). If a source did 
not answer a question appropriately, it was repeated once. The interview was concluded 
after the final open-ended question. 
 
One man and one woman, both with acting experience, were trained as interviewers (see 
Study II). After the interviews, sources filled out three questionnaires and were instructed 
to answer truthfully. With the exception of the less able sources’ checklist including only 
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24 pieces of information, all questionnaires were very similar to those of Study II. The 
interviews were transcribed verbatim and coded for new information revealed (0-24 for 
more able sources; 0-12 for less able sources). To compare the more and less able sources 
as pertains to the amount of new information revealed, ratios were calculated. The new 
information ratio for each source ranged from 0 (revealing no new information) to 1 
(revealing all new information). 
 
In line with previous reasoning behind the Scharff technique (outlined in Study I), Study 
III had the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The Scharff protocol would result in relatively more new information. 
Hypothesis 2: As pertains to the amount of new information revealed, we expected the 
difference between the Scharff protocol and the direct approach to be more pronounced 
when interviewing sources less (vs. more) willing to cooperate. 
Hypothesis 3: Sources interviewed with the Scharff protocol would perceive the 
interviewer as relatively more knowledgeable. 
Hypothesis 4: In terms of information misperceived to be already known by the 
interviewer, such misperceptions would be relatively more common for sources faced 
with the Scharff protocol.  
Hypothesis 5: Sources in the Scharff condition would have a relatively less clear 
understanding of what information the interviewer was after. 
Hypothesis 6: Sources in the Scharff condition would underestimate their contribution of 
new information. Sources in the direct approach would overestimate their contribution of 
new information. 
 
Results. In support of H1, the Scharff technique resulted in relatively more new 
information for all four source categories (but not significantly so for the more 
willing/less able sources). When comparing the more and the less willing sources, the 
Scharff technique resulted in a slight increase in the amount of new information gathered 
from less willing sources, whereas the direct approach resulted in a slight decrease of new 
information gathered (Figure 4). Thus, H2 was supported. In addition, sources 
interviewed with the Scharff technique (i) found the interviewer to be more 
knowledgeable (supporting H3), (ii) misperceived the interviewer’s knowledge to a higher 
degree (supporting H4) and (iii) found it more difficult to read the interviewer’s 
information objectives (supporting H5) when compared to sources interviewed with the 
direct approach. Finally, with the Scharff technique, all categories of sources 
underestimated their contributions of new information. With the direct approach, all 
categories of sources overestimated their contributions of new information but only 
significantly so for the more able/less willing sources. Thus, H6 was largely supported. 
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Figure 4. Mean ratio of new information revealed for the interview conditions 
when interviewing sources with different levels of cooperation. Error bars 
represent 95% CI’s. 
 
 
Discussion. When interviewing sources less willing to cooperate, it is important to use 
effective interview tactics. Comparing the more and less cooperative sources, the direct 
approach resulted in a slight decrease in the amount of new information gathered from 
less willing sources (see Figure 4). The Scharff technique, however, resulted in a slight 
increase in the amount of new information gathered from less willing sources. That is, the 
comparative efficacy of the Scharff technique was magnified when interviewing sources 
who were less willing to cooperate. More specifically, the Scharff technique outperformed 
the direct approach when interviewing both categories of less willing sources (both more 
and less capable of providing new information). Arguably, these results point towards the 
Scharff technique’s efficacy for circumventing sources’ counter-interrogation strategies. 
When interviewing sources who are quite willing to cooperate, the choice of interview 
technique might be less important. Nonetheless, the Scharff technique still outperformed 
the direct approach when interviewing the more cooperative and more capable sources. It 
was only when the sources were more cooperative and less capable of providing 
information that the direct approach resulted in a similar amount of new information as 
the Scharff technique. 
 
Sources interviewed with the Scharff technique consistently perceived the interviewer to 
be relatively more knowledgeable about the situation. Furthermore, the knowing-it-all 
story, in combination with presenting claims including the correct alternative, resulted in 
the illusion that the interviewer held information beyond what was told. This finding is 
supported by the fact that sources consistently misperceived the interviewer’s knowledge 
to a relatively higher degree when interviewed with the Scharff technique. Furthermore, 
the Scharff technique consistently resulted in sources finding it more difficult to 
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determine what information the interviewer sought to collect. A reasonable explanation 
for this is that no questions were asked and that new information was ignored. 
 
Finally, with the Scharff technique, all sources underestimated their contributions of new 
information. With the direct approach, the results showed a strong tendency for sources to 
overestimate their contributions. This pattern was significantly displayed with the more 
willing and more capable sources. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
The major aim of this thesis was to examine interview techniques for gathering 
intelligence from human sources. In response to the paucity of research on techniques 
aimed at human intelligence gathering, this thesis introduced a novel experimental set-up 
as well as a set of new dependent measures for evaluating the efficacy of human 
intelligence gathering techniques. Furthermore, the thesis (a) suggested a psychological 
framework for the Scharff technique and (b) provided a conceptualization of the tactics 
used by WWII interrogator Hanns Scharff. The efficacy of the Scharff technique was 
examined in a series of studies. In Study I, the conceptualization of the Scharff technique 
was refined, and the dependent measures advanced, compared to the first scientific 
examination of the technique (Granhag et al., 2015). In Study II, the ecological validity of 
three aspects was improved: (i) the source and interviewer met in person (in Study I, they 
talked on the phone), (ii) the source was allowed to fabricate information (this was not the 
case in Study I) and (iii) two versions of the Scharff technique were used (the additional 
version presented claims that included a mix of correct/incorrect alternatives while, in 
Study I, all claims included only the correct alternative). In Study III, the ecological 
validity was further improved by systematically varying the sources’ level of cooperation 
(i.e., more/less willing) and capability to provide information (i.e., more/less able). 
 
 
Main Findings 
 
The Scharff technique demonstrated its superiority over the direct approach as a tool for 
gathering intelligence from human sources in all three studies. The Scharff technique 
consistently resulted in relatively more new information and led sources to provide new 
information unknowingly. Furthermore, the sources interviewed with the Scharff 
technique had a relatively more difficult time understanding what information the 
interviewer sought to collect. Finally, the Scharff technique interviewer was consistently 
perceived as relatively more knowledgeable about the topic under discussion. As will be 
discussed in detail below, these outcomes are largely based on two factors pulling in the 
same direction. First, semi-cooperative sources who faced the knowing-it-all story 
provided information beyond the story presented by the interviewer. Second, the 
knowing-it-all story in combination with presenting claims resulted in sources 
misperceiving the knowledge of the Scharff interviewer, which, in turn, led them to 
provide new information unknowingly. Successively, the scope of this discussion will be 
broadened by considering the interview context for the Scharff technique. In the following 
section, the introduced experimental set-up and some distinctive aspects of the studies 
will be discussed. After that, the psychological aspects of the Scharff technique will be 
considered, as well as the technique’s placement in the research field. Finally, areas for 
advancement will be suggested, ethical issues acknowledged, practical implications 
proposed and limitations of the research mentioned. 
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New information 
It was expected that a semi-cooperative source who strives to be perceived as willing to 
cooperate would provide relatively more new information when faced with the knowing-
it-all story. This prediction was clearly supported in Study I and II and received indirect 
support in Study III (this particular topic was not directly examined in Study III). This 
outcome is mainly attributed to two of the Scharff technique’s tactics. The interviewer 
started the interaction by expressing understanding for the source’s situation and offered 
to share already held information to make the conversation more efficient (i.e., by 
adopting a friendly approach). When the request to share information was accepted, the 
interviewer presented the knowing-it-all story. Then, the interviewer invited the source to 
contribute. These tactics resulted in the source avoiding repeating the information already 
presented by the interviewer. In contrast, when the direct approach interviewer invited the 
source to reveal information via an open-ended question, the source provided, as expected, 
a mix of information known and unknown to the interviewer. Hence, the Scharff tactics 
preserved the source’s willingness to provide information while redirecting the source 
towards revealing information beyond what the interviewer told. 
 
 
Towards an illusion of knowing it all 
It was argued that the knowing-it-all story would establish the illusion of the interviewer 
being more knowledgeable than s/he actually was. That is, storytelling would influence 
the source to make incorrect inferences regarding the interviewer’s knowledge. This issue 
can be discussed on two levels. The first level refers to the perceived amount of 
information held by the interviewer. The second level refers to the accuracy with which 
knowledge is ascribed to the interviewer. As will be discussed in detail below, the sources 
ascribed a rather accurate amount of information to the Scharff interviewer’s knowledge, 
but many of those pieces of information were not known to the interviewer. With the 
direct approach, both the amount and accuracy of the information ascribed to the 
interviewer were low. 
 
First, the number of information pieces ascribed to the interviewer was counted. For all 
three studies, the Scharff interviewer was perceived as holding more information about 
the situation than the direct approach interviewer. Furthermore, the source’s perception of 
the amount of information held by the Scharff interviewer corresponded with the actual 
amount of information known to the interviewer. The explanation for these findings is 
rather straightforward; presenting known information provides a basis for sources to 
assess how much information the interviewer holds. In comparison, the sources 
underestimated the amount of information held by the direct approach interviewer. 
Specifically, the interviewer was believed to hold, on average, half of the information that 
s/he actually held. The likely explanation for this outcome is that this interviewer did not 
openly demonstrate having any knowledge. Thus, these sources had no indication on 
which to base their estimate when ascribing the amount of information held by the 
interviewer. 
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Second, the accuracy of the information pieces ascribed to the interviewer was assessed. 
That is, we matched (a) the pieces of information perceived to be held by the interviewer 
with (b) the pieces actually held by the interviewer. It was expected that sources facing 
the knowing-it-all story would make relatively more incorrect inferences when assessing 
the interviewer’s knowledge. This prediction was supported in Study II and III (and to 
some extent in Study I as well). That is, the sources in the Scharff condition perceived, to 
a larger extent than the sources in the direct approach condition, the interviewer to hold 
information that the interviewer did, in fact, not hold. 
 
It is reasonable to draw on the psychological phenomenon known as the curse of 
knowledge (Birch & Bloom, 2007) to explain sources’ perceptions of the interviewer’s 
knowledge. First, the source held more information than the interviewer. Thus, the source 
was susceptible to being cursed by his/her knowledge. Second, the likelihood of being 
cursed by knowledge increases if the curse is tied to a plausible rationale (Birch & Bloom, 
2007). Hence, an interviewer who starts an interview by presenting relatively much 
information would add to the plausibility that s/he holds information beyond what was 
presented. In support of this notion, sources perceived the amount of information held by 
the Scharff interviewer to be rather substantial. Furthermore, sources’ accuracy when 
ascribing knowledge to the Scharff interviewer was low. Thus, it is reasonable to argue 
that sources were cursed by their own knowledge. Consequently, the sources interviewed 
with the Scharff technique made incorrect inferences when ascribing knowledge. It is 
important to note that this thesis could not clarify the extent to which the misjudgments 
(as pertains to the interviewer’s knowledge) were due to the knowing-it-all story or the 
posed claims (i.e., confirmation/disconfirmation tactic). However, it is reasonable to argue 
that the knowing-it-all story was the first step towards establishing the illusion that the 
interviewer held information beyond the story presented. 
 
The explanation for sources making relatively fewer incorrect assessments when ascribing 
knowledge to the direct approach interviewer is rather straightforward; an interviewer 
who only poses direct questions will point the source towards information that is 
unknown rather than provide a rationale for being knowledgeable. Hence, the source is 
less likely to be cursed by his/her own knowledge and might, instead, be hesitant to 
ascribe knowledge to the interviewer. Consequently, sources interviewed with the direct 
approach made relatively fewer incorrect assessments when ascribing knowledge to the 
interviewer. 
 
 
The claims 
In brief, in a situation where information exists pointing in two different directions (e.g., 
an attack will happen at either location A or location B), the interviewer can present one 
alternative as a claim for the source to confirm or disconfirm. For this thesis, it was 
expected that the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic would result in elicitation 
advantages when compared to direct questions (e.g., “tell me where the attack will take 
place”). However, the advantage of presenting claims seemed to be dependent upon how 
the tactic was employed. That is, in Study I, the claims elicited significantly more new 
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information than specific questions. This finding should be discussed in light of two 
factors. First, the number of claims presented/specific questions asked was rather high. 
Second, each claim/specific question was posed only once. In Study II, the claims elicited 
more new information than the direct questions but not to a significant extent. The most 
likely reason for this is that the conditions for posing claims/asking questions were 
slightly changed. Specifically, the number of claims/specific questions were fewer and the 
specific questions (but not the claims) were repeated twice if not answered properly. 
Importantly, the claims did not result in relatively more new information, but the 
information objectives of the Scharff interviewer were relatively better masked. It is thus 
reasonable to argue that, as the interview conditions in Study I and II were largely similar, 
these findings support the notion that the efficacy of posing claims depends on how the 
claims are used. Furthermore, it should be noted that prior to presenting the claims, the 
Scharff technique had already resulted in relatively more new information from the initial 
open-ended question. This arguably strengthens the support for the information gathering 
advantage of presenting claims as found in Study I (it should be noted that the efficacy of 
the claims was not specifically examined in Study III). 
 
It is important to note that presenting claims without first demonstrating one’s knowledge 
seems to be ineffective (Granhag, Cancinos Montecinos et al., 2015). Hence, the claims 
should be viewed as an extension of the knowing-it-all story rather than a quick fix to 
elicit information (May, Granhag & Oleszkiewicz, 2014). That is, it is crucial that the 
source perceives the interviewer as knowledgeable before the interviewer presents claims. 
 
 
Sources’ counter-interrogation strategies 
To reiterate, after having instructed a source to be semi-cooperative, s/he was expected to 
exploit opportunities to be perceived as cooperative and attempt to provide information 
s/he believed to already be known to the interviewer. However, for such a strategy to 
work successfully, the interviewer’s knowledge had to be correctly predicted. Otherwise, 
the source would risk revealing information new to the interviewer. Studies II and III 
showed that sources interviewed with the Scharff technique are more likely to misjudge 
the interviewer’s knowledge. Hence, these sources were expected to act on the reveal-
only-known-information counter-interrogation strategy and would thus unknowingly 
reveal information that was new to the interviewer. Accordingly, in all studies, sources 
faced with the Scharff technique consistently perceived that they revealed somewhat less 
new information. Thus, when relating sources’ perceptions with the new information 
actually revealed, the sources faced with the Scharff technique consistently 
underestimated their contributions of new information (Studies I, II & III). This 
underestimation is mainly attributed to three Scharff tactics all pulling in the same 
direction. First, as the interviewer presented the knowing-it-all story, the first step towards 
establishing an illusion was taken. Second, by presenting claims the interviewer was 
perceived to hold information beyond what was told in the knowing-it-all story. Third, as 
the interviewer did not signal when new information was collected, the source had a 
difficult time understanding when s/he had provided new information. It is reasonable to 
argue that these three tactics directed the source towards new information while making it 
41 
 
difficult for the source to understand when new information had been revealed. This 
notion is supported by the fact that sources revealed more new information when 
interviewed with the Scharff technique than with the direct approach. That is, the Scharff 
technique led the sources to provide new information unknowingly. 
 
In contrast, sources faced with the direct approach generally overestimated their 
contributions of new information (Studies I & II). This outcome can be explained by the 
fact that the direct approach interviewer did not present information during the interview. 
Thus, these sources had an inferior basis for assessing the interviewer’s knowledge and 
were therefore hesitant to ascribe knowledge to the interviewer. Hence, the sources 
interviewed with the direct approach underestimated the interviewer’s knowledge, which, 
in turn, made them overestimate their contributions of new information. 
 
In Study III, the sources were either more or less willing to cooperate and either more or 
less capable of providing information. When faced with the direct approach (but not when 
faced with the Scharff technique) the sources’ level of willingness and ability affected 
their estimation of the amount of new information revealed. Specifically, with the direct 
approach, the sources who were more willing to cooperate and more able to provide 
information overestimated their contribution of new information. The sources who were 
less willing and/or less capable also overestimated their contribution of new information, 
but not to a significant extent. 
 
The lack of significant overestimations in Study III could be explained in light of the 
argument that the direct approach provides an inferior basis for assessing the interviewer’s 
knowledge. First, the more capable sources were given more pieces of information about 
the upcoming terrorist attack. Arguably, sources holding more information may be 
affected by their willingness to cooperate with the interviewer. That is, sources who are 
less willing to cooperate may be more careful when revealing information. Thus, these 
sources may have been relatively more aware of every piece of information revealed 
when facing direct questions. Second, the more willing sources were instructed to reveal 
quite a lot of information but not reveal everything they knew. These sources’ perceptions 
may have been affected by the amount of information they held on the topic. That is, 
holding little information may make it easier to keep track of the relevance of the 
information held. Thus, they might have been able to better understand the value of their 
own contribution when facing direct questions. 
 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Scharff technique resulted in a slight increase of 
new information when interviewing sources less willing to cooperate compared to sources 
more willing to cooperate, particularly so when taking into account that the opposite 
pattern was found with the direct approach. That is, with the direct approach, the more 
willing sources revealed slightly more new information than the less willing sources 
(Study III). Thus, comparing the more and less willing sources between the interview 
conditions, the comparative efficacy of the Scharff technique was magnified when 
interviewing less cooperative sources. Hence, this thesis lends support to the idea that the 
Scharff technique can be used to circumvent sources’ counter-interrogation strategies. 
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Masking information objectives 
Another aspect of information elicitation is the attempt to mask what information the 
interviewer is after. As the Scharff technique interviewer only asked the source to add 
information after the knowing-it-all story, this technique was expected to result in 
relatively better masked information objectives. This was supported in Studies II and III. 
That is, both studies showed sources faced with the Scharff technique had a relatively less 
clear understanding of what information the interviewer aimed to collect. The reason for 
this effect is mainly attributed to three of the Scharff technique’s tactics. First, the 
interviewer avoided asking explicit questions (not pressing for information tactic). Second, 
instead of explicitly asking for specific details, the interviewer presented claims 
(confirmation/disconfirmation tactic), which made it less obvious that this was 
information actually being asked for. Third, when a source provided new information (e.g., 
by responding to a claim), the interviewer treated the contribution similarly to when 
already known information was discussed (i.e., ignore new information tactic). Thus, it 
can be argued that the combination of these tactics makes it difficult for the source to 
understand what information the interviewer is after. It should be reiterated that the 
Scharff technique did not result in relatively better masked information objectives in 
Study I. The reason for this is attributed to the large number of claims posed. The sources 
faced with the direct approach expressed a relatively clearer understanding of the 
interviewer’s information interests (Studies II & III). The explanation for this outcome is 
rather straightforward; posing explicit question provides a relatively good understanding 
for what information the interviewer seeks to collect. 
 
 
The context for the Scharff technique 
Before adopting any interview technique for gathering intelligence, it is important to 
properly assess a source’s level of cooperation. A source’s cooperation level can be 
illustrated on a continuum that ranges from being fully cooperative to completely 
uncooperative. If a source is identified as fully cooperative, the source is willing to 
provide all known information. In such cases, there is little need for elicitation tactics. The 
interviewer should instead use memory-enhancing techniques (e.g., the cognitive 
interview) to extract a reliable and comprehensive report (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). If a 
source is completely uncooperative, the source will not engage in communication and 
might even refuse to acknowledge the presence of an interviewer. In such cases, 
elicitation tactics might not work. The interviewer should instead establish 
communication by using rapport-building techniques (Abbe & Brandon, 2013; Alison et 
al., 2013; Alison et al., 2014a) and an adaptive communication style  (Taylor, 2002, 2014). 
Consequently, the conceptualization of the Scharff technique presented in this thesis is not 
designed for interviewing fully cooperative or completely uncooperative sources; it is 
tailored towards semi-cooperative sources. In such cases, sources are willing to share only 
a portion of the information held and elicitation tactics can lead the sources to 
(unknowingly) increase the value of their contribution. Importantly, semi-cooperative 
sources are common in real life (cf. Fein, Lehner & Vossekuil, 2006). 
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It is not uncommon for sources to try their best to reveal little new information. In such 
cases, the interviewer might be required to direct the source towards specific information 
topics to better assure new information being revealed. An unobtrusive way of directing a 
source towards new information is to make use of the intelligence already held (by the 
interviewer). For information gathering purposes, the known information can be presented 
at the outset of the interview in order to direct the source away from already known 
information and towards new information. Consider an interviewer who starts the 
interview by presenting all information already held on the case. If the source then wants 
to be perceived as cooperative, s/he cannot simply repeat the information already stated 
by the interviewer. The source will instead have to go beyond the interviewer’s story and 
provide new information. 
 
 
Methodological Considerations 
 
The experimental paradigm 
Fully mirroring the conditions of a human intelligence interaction is arguably impossible 
in a controlled lab-study. However, there are important features that can be mirrored in an 
experimental setting. One important aspect of the experimental paradigm introduced is the 
information management dilemma sources were required to navigate. To reiterate, sources 
were told that they had to reveal some information in exchange for assistance. They were 
also told that they had to avoid revealing too much information in order to prevent 
repercussions from the terrorist group. However, as no detailed instructions were provided 
for how to manage the information, the dilemma could have been interpreted differently 
by different sources. Importantly, this thesis provides two findings that point toward the 
validity of this dilemma. First, in all studies, the sources rated the instructions as easy to 
understand. Second, averaged over all sources in Studies I and II, a bit more than one fifth 
of the total amount of information held by sources concerning the upcoming attack was 
revealed (approx. 24% with the Scharff technique and 22% with the direct approach). 
This shows that the sources were more uncooperative than cooperative and took their task 
seriously (Study III is not included here as the dilemma was manipulated). Furthermore, 
as has been argued, the total amount of information might be of lesser value for 
intelligence gathering purposes (e.g., for mapping networks and future plans). Thus, it is 
important to examine the proportion of new information revealed. Consequently, we 
investigated the pieces of information known to the sources but not to the interviewer 
prior to the interview. Collapsing the new information revealed in Studies I and II, the 
Scharff technique resulted in approximately 29% of the new information available to the 
sources being revealed to the interviewer. The corresponding percentage for the direct 
approach was 21%. These percentages support the notion that information elicited with 
the Scharff technique has a higher ratio of new information compared to information 
elicited with the direct approach. In conclusion, the information management dilemma 
introduced in this thesis shows promise for encouraging sources to be semi-cooperative. 
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The progression of the examination 
The studies in this thesis have followed a practicality-oriented progression. Broadly 
speaking, the progression started with Granhag’s (2010) first theoretical conceptualization 
of the Scharff technique, followed by the first scientific test of the technique (Granhag et 
al., 2015). Following in those footsteps, this thesis has advanced the experimental set-up 
by successively increasing the ecological validity of the examinations. The experimental 
progression is discussed below. 
 
First, the source/interviewer interactions became more realistic. With respect to physical 
distance, the Scharff technique outperformed the direct approach when the interviewer 
and source (a) sat in separate rooms talking over the phone, as well as (b) sat face-to-face 
in the same room. 
 
Second, as pertains to managing information, some psychological factors were made more 
realistic. With respect to the information management dilemma, the Scharff technique 
outperformed the direct approach when sources balanced their dilemma (a) with the 
information on paper in front of them as well as (b) when the information was memorized. 
Importantly, no direct effects resulting from changing the ways in which sources managed 
information have been identified. For example, the amount of misinformation reported 
was very low in all three studies and equally distributed between the conditions. Moreover, 
the opportunity to fabricate information did not affect the efficacy of the Scharff 
technique. However, it should be noted that only a handful of participants provided false 
details when allowed. The reason for the low number of fabrications could be explained 
by two factors pulling in the same direction. First, in order to balance the information 
management dilemma, the sources had to withhold truthful information during the 
interview. Thus, as withholding information is considered lying (DePaulo, Kashy, 
Kirkendol, Wyer & Epstein, 1996), balancing such an information management dilemma 
could arguably account for some degree of cognitive load (Vrij, 2008; Vrij & Granhag, 
2012). Second, as the sources were to receive a favor in exchange for information, 
fabricating information in combination with balancing the information management 
dilemma likely made the challenge (receiving the favor) even more difficult. It is thus 
reasonable to assume this dilemma largely accounts for the low number of fabrications. 
Simply put, a source who aims to receive a favor in exchange for information might find 
it too risky to fabricate information. 
 
Third, sources are often screened and categorized based on (a) the likelihood they hold 
information and (b) their estimated level of cooperation (US Army, 2006). Thus, the 
sources in this thesis became more representative of real-life sources (Study III). That is, 
the capability to provide information was manipulated by providing background 
information containing a fixed amount of more (36 pieces) or less (24 pieces) information. 
Manipulating the sources willingness to cooperate was a bit less straightforward. 
Specifically, the sources were instructed to either reveal only a small amount of 
information but without being completely silent (less willing) or reveal a fair amount of 
information but without telling everything (more cooperative). It should be noted that the 
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sources rated the instructions as very easy to understand. This provides some support for 
the notion that the instructions were understood and followed. 
 
Fourth, the use of claims was made more flexible over the studies. For Studies I and III, 
the Scharff technique interviewer presented claims that included the correct alternative 
(for the source to confirm). However, in Study II, the Scharff technique interviewer also 
presented claims that included an incorrect alternative (for the source to disconfirm). 
Although the claims including incorrect alternatives were too few to analyze statistically 
in this thesis, the tactic of presenting incorrect alternatives (i.e., incorrect claims) still 
merits discussion. The reason for including relatively few incorrect claims is that 
presenting a high number of incorrect alternatives would work against establishing the 
illusion of knowing it all. Importantly, presenting one incorrect claim (out of three total 
claims) did not affect the illusion negatively (Study II). That is, the interviewers’ 
knowledge was misperceived to a similar extent when presenting (a) three claims that 
included correct alternatives as when presenting (b) one incorrect claim and two correct 
claims. Furthermore, posing incorrect claims was expected to result in the source 
responding with simple corrections (e.g., “No” or “That’s incorrect”). However, simple 
corrections to incorrect claims did not occur more often than affirmations to correct 
claims. 
 
 
Theoretical Contribution 
 
The psychology of the Scharff technique 
As stated earlier, Scharff tried to imagine himself in his prisoners’ position and he did this 
to attempt to better understand and predict their behavior. This allowed him to develop 
tactics to circumvent his prisoners’ counter-interrogation strategies (Granhag, 2010). In 
line with the suggestion that an interviewer should consider the cognitions of a source 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2008), the Scharff technique promotes perspective-taking (Galinsky 
et al., 2008). By placing him/herself in the shoes of the source, the interviewer can 
contemplate the source’s motives (Carver & Scheier, 2012) and predict the source’s 
behavior (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 2015). Differently stated, through perspective taking, 
the source’s perceptions of the interview can be monitored and the source’s counter-
interrogation strategies anticipated. Consequently, perspective-taking can be valuable for 
implementing tactics to reach specific interview objectives (Luke et al., 2014; Tekin et al., 
2015). 
 
This thesis indirectly supports the notion that the psychological concept of perspective 
taking is important for intelligence interviewers (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Justice et al., 
2010; Soufan, 2011). The Scharff technique draws on sources adopting counter-
interrogation strategies (Granhag, 2010; Scharff, 1950). These strategies can be linked to 
the basic psychology of self-regulation theory (Carver & Scheier, 2012), a social 
cognitive framework for understanding how people control their behavior to steer towards 
desired goals and steer away from undesirable outcomes (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 
2015). For this thesis, this idea was mirrored in the information management dilemma 
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sources were required to navigate, to reveal information to receive the help needed (the 
desired outcome), but without revealing too much or too little information (the 
undesirable outcome). To counteract the sources’ strategies, the Scharff technique played 
on their perceptions of the interview. Specifically, to affect the source’s perception of the 
interviewer’s (a) knowledge and (b) information interests. The aim of affecting the 
source’s perceptions was to influence the source to alter his/her initially planned behavior 
by adopting an alternative and less calculated plan on the spot. That is, the interview 
protocol was developed with the source’s perception of the interviewer in mind (e.g., the 
interviewer probably knows nothing [or very little] about the situation). It is reasonable to 
assume that by presenting information at the outset of the interview, the source’s 
perception was changed (e.g., I was wrong, the interviewer knows a lot). This might have 
resulted in the source’s counter-interrogation strategies being affected, leading the source 
to reveal information other than what s/he had initially planned to reveal (e.g., I was 
prepared to say A and B, but now I have to say C and D). In sum, it is probably fair to 
argue that the Scharff technique influenced the sources to revise their initial plan and 
adopt a new one. 
 
In conclusion, the Scharff technique is anchored in the following basic principles: (a) a 
source typically forms a hypothesis on how much and what information the interviewer 
already holds, (b) the source’s perception will affect his/her counter-interrogation 
strategies and (c) the counter-interrogation strategies employed will affect how much and 
what information the source reveals. These basic principles compose a model reflecting 
the source’s reasoning (see Figure 1 in the introduction). It can be argued that an 
interviewer who fully grasps the relation between these basic principles can utilize 
perspective taking to anticipate the specific reactions of an individual source and will 
therefore be in a better position to conduct a successful interview (Granhag & Hartwig, 
2015). 
 
 
Placing the Scharff technique in the research field 
Affecting the source’s perception. One important aim of the Scharff technique is to affect 
the source’s perception of what information the interviewer knows and what information 
the interviewer seeks to collect. To my knowledge there is only one other interview 
technique that systematically and explicitly exploits sources’ perceptions in a similar 
fashion: the strategic use of evidence (SUE) technique (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). 
Applied primarily for interviewing suspects, the SUE technique advocates the interviewer 
starting the interview with asking the suspect to provide a full account of what happened. 
After having exhausted the suspect’s explanation for a piece of evidence, the interviewer 
can confront the suspect with that piece of evidence. The rationale for presenting evidence 
after listening to the suspect’s account is that a guilty suspect who does not know what 
evidence exists against him/her will have a difficult time deciding what information to 
reveal and what information to withhold. In contrast, disclosing a piece of evidence before 
asking the suspect to address it allows the guilty suspect to adjust his/her responses to fit 
the evidence already held by the interviewer (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Granhag, 
Strömwall et al., 2013). 
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The goal of the SUE technique is to aid the interviewer in distinguishing between guilty 
and innocent suspects. To reach this goal, the interviewer attempts to influence the 
suspect’s management of self-incriminating information. The goal of the Scharff 
technique is to gather information. To reach this goal, the interviewer attempts to 
influence the source’s management of information in general. Consequently, both the 
Scharff technique and the SUE technique aim to affect the source’s/suspect’s perceptions. 
However, the two techniques have different interview objectives and utilize different 
strategies for reaching their desired objectives.  
 
The first difference between the SUE and Scharff techniques pertains to the knowledge 
ascribed to the interviewer. The SUE interviewer aims to relate the suspect’s initial 
statements to the already held evidence and then encourage the suspect to explain any 
inconsistencies. The Scharff technique interviewer aims to gather additional information 
that s/he wishes to acquire. This is accomplished by making it seem as if the interviewer 
already holds information about the critical event in question. Thus, the SUE interviewer 
wants to be perceived as less knowledgeable, while the Scharff interviewer wants to be 
perceived as more knowledgeable, than s/he actually is (for a new approach combining 
these two tactics, see Tekin et al., 2015). The second difference pertains to how 
information is requested. With the SUE technique, the interviewer encourages the source 
to provide complete statements before confronting him/her with evidence. With the 
Scharff technique, it is important to not show interest in particular pieces of information 
and refrain from posing questions that might reveal gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge. 
Hence, the SUE interviewer can explicitly ask for specific information, whereas the 
Scharff interviewer should elicit information covertly rather than specifically ask for it. 
 
Atmosphere of the interview. Another important feature of the Scharff technique is to 
create an environment that promotes a relaxed and comfortable interaction. Research on 
human intelligence gathering has recently emphasized the importance of creating and 
maintaining a positive atmosphere rather than relying on a specific recipe (quick fix) for 
establishing rapport (Alison et al., 2013; Walsh & Bull, 2012). By analyzing real terrorist 
interviews, Alison and his colleagues (2013) developed a promising framework for 
assessing interviewer behavior, observing rapport-based interpersonal techniques 
(ORBIT). Basically, ORBIT consists of three components: (a) creating a collaborative 
rather than confrontational environment, (b) evoking information rather than demanding it, 
and (c) honoring the source’s autonomy rather than highlighting the interviewer’s 
authority. There are clear links between the ORBIT framework and Scharff technique. 
First, the friendly approach is fully compatible with ORBIT’s collaborative environment, 
as well as its component of honoring the source’s autonomy. Second, not pressing for 
information and confirmation/disconfirmation tactics match well with ORBIT’s 
component of evoking, rather than demanding, information. In essence, if ORBIT were to 
be viewed as a general framework for conducting successful and ethical intelligence 
interviews, the Scharff technique would fit neatly within this broader framework. 
 
Presenting information. The most recognized feature of the Scharff technique is the 
interviewer presenting already known information up front (US Army, 2006). Another 
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well-known suspect interviewing technique also presents evidence up front, the REID 
technique (Inbau, Reid, Buckley & Jayne, 2013). The REID technique interview can be 
illustrated as follows. When the interviewer is convinced of a suspect’s guilt, s/he starts to 
confront the suspect with evidence that clearly indicates guilt. This is followed by the 
interviewer downplaying the moral seriousness of the offence and providing contextual 
excuses for the suspect having committed the crime. If the suspect denies the charges, s/he 
is immediately interrupted. If the suspect objects to the charges by offering explanations, 
s/he is directly confronted with accusations of guilt. When the suspect perceives his/her 
objections to be ineffective, the interviewer holds the suspect’s attention and continues to 
break down resistance by displaying sympathy. The interviewer then offers two 
alternatives of involvement with the crime. Both alternatives are highly incriminating, but 
one allows the suspect to save face more than the other. Finally, the interviewer aims to 
have the suspect confess verbally and then develops the verbal confession into a written 
confession (see Gudjonsson, 2003, for a critical evaluation of the REID technique). 
 
Both the Scharff and REID techniques aim to convince the source that knowledge about 
the case is already possessed. However, the techniques have very different tactical aims 
with respect to demonstrating knowledge. That is, the REID technique aims to affect the 
source’s perception of the cost-benefit ratio of confessing to the offence. This is done by 
maintaining the source’s guilt throughout the interview and fabricating a “good deal” or 
“best way out” of the situation. In contrast, the Scharff technique aims to lead the source 
to provide new information and reveal new information unknowingly. Hence, the REID 
technique presents knowledge to make the source choose between given options, whereas 
the Scharff technique presents knowledge to influence the source to make incorrect 
inferences. 
 
In sum, the REID technique aims to coerce the suspect into compliance by making 
him/her want to escape the situation. In contrast, Scharff gained his prisoners’ cooperation 
by relieving external pressure. That is, he demonstrated, in a friendly manner, that 
information was already known on the topic under discussion (Toliver, 1997). 
Consequently, the conceptualization of the Scharff technique presented in this thesis 
speaks against any compatibility with the REID technique. To illustrate with an example, 
in an intelligence gathering scenario, it is unlikely the interviewer would convince the 
source that s/he knows everything if using a coercive questioning technique (i.e., 
disregarding the not pressing for information tactic). The argument here is that any single 
tactic of the Scharff technique is unlikely to be very effective if used as the sole tactic. 
 
Categorizing the Scharff technique. In a recent review article, Kelly and his colleagues 
(2013) attempted to organize and categorize all law enforcement interview techniques 
(primarily suspect interviewing) that have been identified by researchers. The authors 
identified 824 techniques and grouped these into six broad categories: (1) emotional 
provocation, (2) rapport and relationship building, (3) confrontation and competition, (4) 
collaboration, (5) context manipulation and (6) presentation of evidence (Kelly et al., 
2013). However, in order to fit the conceptualization of the Scharff technique presented in 
this thesis within this taxonomy, the technique would have to be divided into several parts. 
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First, the positive atmosphere of the Scharff technique (i.e., the friendly approach, not 
pressing for information) fits under category (2), rapport and relationship building. 
Second, some of the more tactical features of the Scharff technique (i.e., the knowing-it-
all illusion, confirmation/disconfirmation) fit under category (6), presentation of evidence. 
However, one tactical component (i.e., ignoring new information) does not fit into any of 
the taxonomy’s categories. In sum, the taxonomy is not constructed to embed a human 
intelligence gathering technique like the Scharff technique. 
 
It is important to point out that the taxonomy above concerns interview dynamics (i.e., to 
navigate between different approaches) rather than information objectives (i.e., gathering 
information of specific interest). Explained via an example, the interviewer’s information 
objectives can be illustrated as a dartboard (Figure 5). The first level (the outer circle of 
the dartboard) relates to facilitating communication. That is, this level revolves around, 
for example, the source’s state of mind (e.g., appealing to identity, instrumental or 
relational concerns; Taylor, 2002) and cultural belonging (e.g., choosing an approach that 
saves face or provides rational arguments; Beune, Giebels & Sanders, 2009). The outer 
layer is arguably critical for facilitating information gathering. However, some sources 
might deliberately avoid providing critical information. Thus, to collect specific pieces of 
information, the interviewer must often utilize specific tactical tools. These types of 
tactics are captured in the small inner circle. The Scharff technique, with its tactics 
specifically aimed at information elicitation, can be placed in this inner circle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Illustration of the interviewer’s information objectives as a dartboard 
ranging from general to specific objectives. 
 
 
Future Directions 
 
The experimental set-up 
An experimental set-up for examining human intelligence gathering techniques should 
account for a large number of specific and general details. Thus, one strength of the 
introduced set-up was that it allowed participants to study a large amount of diverse 
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information. This allowed a rather representative interaction for which the researchers 
could allocate the knowledge held by both the source and interviewer. However, although 
the set-up was relatively representative in this respect, it came with a potential drawback; 
the information management dilemma holds no instructions for how to assess the value of 
each piece of information. That is, as the aim was to guide sources to adopt a rather 
uncooperative mindset whilst balancing an information management dilemma, direct 
instructions on how to deal with specific information would have rendered that dilemma 
more or less meaningless. Importantly, measures regarding the quality of information are 
better captured in other experimental set-ups such as that used by Evans and colleagues 
(2013) where the aim was to collect guilty knowledge. For future studies, it might be 
valuable to assess the Scharff technique drawing on the set-up introduced by Evans et al. 
(2013). 
 
 
The dependent measures 
A human intelligence gathering interaction can result in various types of outcomes. Hence, 
evaluating the overall outcome can be a rather complex task. Thus, mapping the 
comparative efficacy of different intelligence gathering techniques comes with a number 
of challenges. Consequently, for this thesis, contributions were not limited to evaluating 
objective and subjective aspects of the interaction. An additional contribution came from 
the idea of relating two measures to arrive at a critical measure of efficacy (i.e., the 
source’s estimation of the amount of new information revealed). Below, four dependent 
measures that might profit from future refinements will be discussed. 
 
First, when discussing the dependent measures in the introduction, it was argued that 
semi-cooperative sources can maintain control of their willingness to cooperate by 
adjusting the precision of their responses. When evaluating the specificity of the new 
information gathered in Study I, it was found that precision was highly correlated with 
quantity (Evans & Fisher, 2011). Hence, for this thesis, it was not overly meaningful to 
analyze the specificity measure. It is important to note that the degree of specificity is a 
valuable measure in real life situations as sources might choose to reveal a small amount 
of precise (or a large amount of imprecise) information. Future research is encouraged to 
develop a sound measure to capture the grain-size of revealed information. 
 
Second, this thesis has demonstrated the Scharff technique to be relatively successful in 
masking the interviewer’s information objectives. However, in order to properly interpret 
this result, it should be made clear that this outcome was tapped by collecting a single 
data point from each source, the sources’ own evaluations of how difficult it was to 
understand what information the interviewer sought to collect. Hence, this result does not 
reveal the accuracy of the sources’ assessments. Future studies might profit from 
matching (a) the interviewer’s actual information objectives with (b) the source’s 
perception of the interviewer’s information objectives. 
 
Third, all subjective measures were rated and assessed after the interview. Hence, this 
thesis could not trace if, and if so how, a source’s perception changed during the interview. 
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Future studies might profit from taking on the challenge of obtaining scores prior to the 
interview, as well as during the interview, while avoiding major disturbances to the 
interactions. 
 
Finally, the sources’ perceptions of new information revealed was calculated rather than 
reported. That is, the sources were provided with two checklists after the interview. On 
the first checklist, they marked every information unit that corresponded with the pieces 
of information they believed to have been revealed during the interview. On the second 
checklist, they marked every information unit they believed to have been known by the 
interviewer prior to the interview. Thus, to arrive at the source’s perception of new 
information, the interviewer’s perceived knowledge was subtracted from the perceived 
revealed information checklist. Future studies might consider asking sources to mark the 
information units they believe to be new to the interviewer. 
 
 
Areas for research 
Below, some suggestions for examining various real-life aspects of the Scharff technique 
will be proposed. In total, three areas for future research are discussed. It should be noted 
that the areas described might best be examined via the studying of real cases handling, 
for example, interviews with detainees, informants and prisoners of war. 
 
This thesis draws on the assumption that semi-cooperative sources strive to navigate an 
information management dilemma (Alison et al., 2015; Shumate & Borum, 2006). 
However, little is known about the underlying motivations sources have to talk to an 
intelligence officer. It is reasonable to assume that sources are driven by, for example, 
criminal career opportunities (e.g., wanting a key person arrested to claim that position), 
financial motives (e.g., exchange information for money) and/or safety concerns (e.g., be 
placed in protective custody). The willingness to talk could be labeled as positive 
motivation. The source can also have a variety of reasons for not wanting to talk to an 
intelligence officer. The source might be reluctant because of, for example, career 
disadvantages (e.g., the reputation of collaborating with authorities), business setbacks 
(e.g., increased difficulties for money laundering, trafficking) and/or simply a negative 
attitude towards authorities (e.g., due to real or perceived mistreatments). The reluctance 
to talk could be labeled as negative motivation. Future studies are encouraged to probe 
sources on their experiences and analyze relationships between positive and negative 
motivations. 
 
Counter-interrogation strategies can be sorted under two broad categories, escape 
strategies and avoidance strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). Escape strategies serve to 
terminate direct threats. Thus, escape strategies are behaviors that can manifest as denials 
or silence. Arguably, research on counter-interrogation strategies is positioned rather 
closely to escape strategies (Alison et al., 2014b). Avoidance strategies refer to ways of 
evading aversive stimulus (e.g., avoiding a problem that has not come to the surface). 
Arguably, these strategies might result in verbal responses such as (i) being vague, (ii) 
revealing information that is already known and (iii) avoiding revealing information that 
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the interviewer seeks to obtain (Granhag, 2010; Toliver, 1997; see also Taylor, 2014). It 
would thus be valuable to investigate the counter-interrogation strategies adopted by 
sources in more detail. 
 
Finally, the conceptualization of the Scharff technique presented in this thesis places 
perspective taking at the heart of the technique. The rationale being that the Scharff 
technique’s tactics can be used to circumvent counter-interrogation strategies. In 
accordance with the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Armitage & Conner, 2001), 
future studies are encouraged to examine how counter-interrogation strategies can be (a) 
stimulated, (b) circumvented and (c) interrupted. 
 
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
Psychologist involvement in practice 
In response to the debate concerning the “enhanced interrogation techniques” used under 
the George W. Bush administration, the American Psychological Association (APA) 
ordered an independent review to investigate psychologists’ involvement with respect to 
these techniques (Hoffman et al., 2015). The independent report concluded that APA 
officials had conspired with the US Department of Defense (DoD). Briefly explained, in 
order to continue the use of “enhanced” interrogations, the APA and DoD adjusted the 
ethics policies so as to not constrain the DoD’s interrogative options. The complicit 
collaboration between the APA and the DoD thus secured the continued practice of 
“enhanced interrogations” (Hoffman et al., 2015). It is important to note the APA has 
since acknowledged this wrongdoing and voted 157-1 to ban psychologist participation in 
national security interrogations (www.apa.org). Importantly, this should not discourage 
researchers from evaluating the efficacy of intelligence gathering techniques. In fact, it 
could be argued that it is the responsibility of researchers to inform and educate 
practitioners and policymakers about the latest scientific findings. Arguably, peer-
reviewed research is one of few ways in which intelligence gathering techniques can be 
evaluated on a neutral and transparent basis. 
 
 
Ethical aspects of real-life interviewing 
While there exists a vast body of research describing and evaluating techniques aimed at 
interviewing suspects and gathering intelligence, the ethical discussion for conducting 
such research is rather meager. This is remarkable considering that law enforcement and 
intelligence contexts are filled with opportunities to misuse/abuse power and infringe on 
sources’ rights (Hartwig et al., in press). Hartwig and her colleagues argued that the 
source’s autonomy (i.e., the capacity to make decisions about self-chosen actions) lies at 
the heart of this ethical discussion. They further argue that the ethos of information 
gathering approaches should honor the source’s autonomy by, for example, promoting 
transparency in contrast to, for example, employing false evidence ploys (Hartwig et al., 
in press). 
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Within the field of information gathering, there are techniques that assume both the 
interviewer and source to employ strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Vrij & Granhag, 
2012). In this view, interviewing is considered competitive and thus involves a set of 
more in depth considerations about the strategic mindset of both the interviewer and 
source (Hartwig et al., in press; see also Thagard, 1992). For example, both the 
interviewer and source can choose to withhold information from each other or choose to 
share information. According to paradigmatic definitions of deception, concealing 
information is a form of lying (Vrij, 2008). However, presenting known information can 
come with a deceptive element as well. That is, although the act of sharing information 
can be considered ethical, the intent behind the sharing of information can be deceptive 
(e.g., to influence another to make incorrect inferences). Thus, as both withholding and 
presenting information can include deceptive elements, suspect interviewing and 
intelligence gathering inherently involve some degree of deception. 
 
A complete ethical elaboration on investigative interviewing would demand a thesis of its 
own. However, it is appropriate to mention some ethical issues with respect to using 
psychological tools that might impact a person’s behavior without their full consent. More 
specifically, if the source is influenced to reveal information that is not in his/her best 
interest to reveal. As pertains to the Scharff technique, this would mainly concern the 
illusion of knowing-it-all tactic. It is thus important to note that the conceptualization of 
the Scharff technique presented in this thesis honors the source’s autonomy to provide 
information. Thus, although the Scharff technique influences the source to reveal new 
information unknowingly, the technique does not make the source to reveal information 
that s/he does not want to reveal. On a related note, for this thesis, sources’ motivation to 
talk was based on receiving a reward in exchange for information. It should be noted that 
rewards might affect a source’s perception of the extent to which it might be self-
damaging to reveal certain information. It should also be noted that rewards might make 
the source more willing to fabricate information. 
 
 
Receiving funds from a foreign criminal investigation entity 
Two of the three studies constituting this thesis were funded by the High-Value Detainee 
Interrogation Group (HIG), a group founded by US President Barack Obama as part of an 
attempt to end the abusive methods used in the aftermath of 9/11 (Obama, 2009). The 
HIG has two important roles. The group brings together personnel from the U.S. 
intelligence community to conduct interviews consistent with the rule of law. In addition, 
the group serves as the U.S. Government’s center for interviewing best practices, training 
and scientific research. Thus, researchers who work with the HIG have the opportunity to 
share their findings with policy-makers and intelligence professionals. All HIG-sponsored 
research is unclassified and the findings are published in scientific journals. It should be 
noted that the HIG presents the first possibility for psychologists to impact the policies 
and practices of American national security agencies since the 1960s (Brandon, 2011). 
 
It should additionally be noted what the HIG is and what it is not. The HIG does not 
engage in or advocate any unlawful interview practices. Instead of using force, threats 
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and/or false promises, the HIG uses techniques designed to stimulate voluntary statements. 
Furthermore, the HIG does not select its own intelligence targets and is thus relieved from 
direct personal investment. Finally, the HIG is a multi-agency organization whose 
principal function is intelligence gathering, not law enforcement. Thus, the actions of the 
HIG are documented by, for example, the U.S. Congress and National Security Council. 
 
 
Research ethics 
The ethical concerns for receiving grants from a foreign criminal investigation agency do 
not necessarily have to be different from receiving grants from any other research funding 
agency. That is, the principal investigator (Professor Granhag) proposed the research, a 
research committee evaluated the proposal, the research was awarded the grant in open 
international competition, the studies had to be approved by the local ethical review board 
(in this case, also by the FBI’s ethical review board) and all findings were intended to be 
published in scientific, peer-reviewed journals. Hence, for this particular case, there is no 
difference between receiving a grant from a foreign intelligence agency and a more 
traditional research council. Furthermore, many ethical safeguards were taken with 
respect to the studies’ participants. For example, the participants in Studies II and III were 
required to read and sign very detailed informed consent forms before partaking in the 
studies. In comparison, the informed consent form in Study I (not sponsored by the HIG) 
was much less detailed. It is important to note that all participants who agreed to sign a 
consent form completed their participation. 
 
 
Practical Implications 
 
Most countries in the world have one or more active intelligence agencies. Some 
renowned European examples are the United Kingdom’s Security Service (MI5) and 
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND). 
Two Swedish examples are the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) and the Swedish Military 
Intelligence and Security Service (MUST). All intelligence agencies share the common 
characteristic of being secretive, which may be justified for investigative purposes 
(Shumate & Borum, 2006). However, quite recently, the United States declassified the US 
military’s operative Army Field Manual (US Army, 2006). Importantly, having access to 
an operative manual of this kind allows researchers to openly examine the methods used 
by intelligence practitioners. Thus, the discussion below will draw on the American 
standard, but the practical implications are believed to be of wider relevance. 
 
This thesis has introduced a conceptualization of the Scharff technique that has proven to 
be more effective for gathering intelligence than commonly used protocols (e.g., the direct 
approach). Thus, as the thesis provides empirical support for the efficacy of a technique 
believed to be effective in the field (Toliver, 1997), the conceptualization of the Scharff 
technique presented in this thesis has clear operational relevance. In brief, the Scharff 
technique covers a wide range of applications and can be used for a number of different 
types of sources (e.g., detainees and informants). It is also believed that this thesis adds to 
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the technique’s operational relevance by offering a much more detailed description of the 
technique than what is found in the US Army Field Manual (US Army, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that this thesis has relevance for policy making. The use of so-
called “enhanced interrogation techniques” and extraordinary renditions (Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 2014; The Constitution Project, 2013) is one of the most 
politically charged issues within American policy making since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
Several initiatives have been taken to end the use of these unethical methods. For example, 
President Obama has made it clear that American intelligence interviewers operating in 
support of an armed conflict should only use the methods described in the Army Field 
Manual (Obama, 2009) and this was recently signed into law (November 25th 2015). It 
should be noted, however, that, despite the fact the Army Field Manual has been 
established by executive order as the standard upon which interview operations should be 
conducted by representatives of the United States, the methods set forth in the manual are 
not evidence based (nor are they officially claimed to be). In fact, few of the listed 
interview methods have been subjected to scientific evaluation (Justice et al., 2010). 
Importantly, the methodology used for evaluating the efficacy of the Scharff technique 
shows the possibilities for similar examination of other approaches described in the Army 
Field Manual. That is, this thesis demonstrates that the approaches listed in interview 
manuals can be empirically tested to support, or question, their claimed efficacy. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
Limitations of the experimental set-up 
The experimental set-up employed has a number of limitations. First, some aspects of the 
typical human intelligence interaction are very difficult, impossible even, to mirror in a 
laboratory setting (e.g., high stakes). A second limitation is that all three studies were 
based on student samples. However, the Scharff technique is tailored to counteract 
counter-interrogation strategies and these strategies are arguably more commonly evoked 
by real-life sources than participants in laboratory-based experimental studies (Alison et 
al., 2014b; Soufan, 2011; Toliver, 1997). Hence, the technique might, in fact, be more, not 
less, effective in real-life settings. Third, although this thesis provides a template for 
future experimental work, such research would profit from having access to a selection of 
different scenarios (information management dilemmas) from which proper samples 
could be drawn. Furthermore, the results should be replicated in other research labs, 
preferably examining sources with different cultural backgrounds. Fourth, in all three 
studies, the interviews were short and the interviewer followed semi-structured interview 
protocols. Future studies might profit from examining more realistic situations by, for 
example, allowing longer interview sessions and repeated interactions.  
 
 
Limitations of the Scharff technique 
There are a few limitations of the Scharff technique that should be acknowledged. First, 
there are situations in which the technique might be difficult to use. For example, to 
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properly establish the knowing-it-all illusion, the interviewer must possess a certain 
amount of relevant and accurate information. On the other hand, with the publicly 
available information of today (i.e., OSINT), it is arguably easier to build the reference 
system needed for a knowing-it-all illusion than it was during WWII. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that there are examples where Scharff (Toliver, 1997), as well as more 
modern interrogators such as Ali Soufan (2011), managed to build this illusion with only 
a single piece of critical information. A second related limitation is that, for some 
situations, it would be a clear tactical mistake to reveal how much and what intelligence 
the interviewer holds on a certain topic. For example, a source that is not in custody may 
go on to inform the individual(s) about which the intelligence pertains. Networks might 
also deploy false sources to discover what is known about them and their activities. Third, 
there are many different forms of human intelligence interactions and the Scharff 
technique is primarily aimed at settings where the source expects to be questioned. Such 
interactions might take place in a voluntary context (as mirrored in this thesis) or in a non-
voluntary, custodial setting (similar to the context in which Hanns Scharff developed his 
technique). Other human intelligence interactions are characterized by a clandestine 
component and may occur as a seemingly causal conversation. It is not claimed that the 
results of the studies in this thesis can be generalized to such covert intelligence gathering. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In wake of recent terrorist attacks and the increased threat of worldwide terror, there is an 
acute need for effective techniques to gather human intelligence (Brandon, 2011). This 
thesis attempts to meet that call by offering an evaluation of the technique used by WWII 
interrogator Hanns Scharff. The results have shown the Scharff technique to outperform 
the direct approach as pertains to several important measures of efficacy. Specifically, it 
was demonstrated that an interviewer can affect a source’s perception and, thus, steer the 
source towards revealing new information. Furthermore, the conceptualization of the 
Scharff technique presented in this thesis encouraged sources to reveal new information 
unknowingly. In sum, this thesis offers four contributions. First, it provides a conceptual 
framework explicating the psychological aspects of the tactics constituting the Scharff 
technique. Second, it introduces a new experimental paradigm to examine the efficacy of 
human intelligence gathering techniques. Third, it offers a new set of dependent measures 
to be used for mapping the efficacy of human intelligence gathering techniques. Finally, it 
demonstrates empirical support for the efficacy of the approach adopted by the renowned 
interrogator Hanns Scharff. In sum, this thesis provides support for the Scharff technique 
as an effective tool for eliciting information from human sources. 
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Did your plane carry bombs in it or didn’t it? You cannot ask that 
direct question, he will never answer it. But in the course of a regular 
conversation he will probably drop somewhere an indication that he 
did or he didn’t, without even knowing what he said. 
 
Hanns Scharff 
 
59 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Aarts, H., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Hassin, R. R. (2004). Goal contagion: Perceiving is for 
pursuing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 23-37. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.1.23 
Abbe, A., & Brandon, S. E. (2013). The role of rapport in investigative interviewing: A 
review. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 10, 237-
249. doi:10.1002/jip.1386 
Abbe, A., & Brandon, S. E. (2014). Building and maintaining rapport in investigative 
interviews. Police Practice and Research, 15, 207-220. 
doi:10.1080/15614263.2013.827835 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 50, 179-211. doi:10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-T 
Alison, L., Alison, E., Noone, G., Elntib, S., & Christiansen, P. (2013). Why tough tactics 
fail and rapport gets results: Observing rapport-based interpersonal techniques 
(ORBIT) to generate useful information from terrorists. Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law, 19, 411-431. doi:10.1037/a0034564 
Alison, L., Alison, E., Noone, G., Elntib, S., Waring, S., & Christiansen, P. (2014a). The 
efficacy of rapport-based techniques for minimizing counter-interrogation 
tactics amongst a field sample of terrorists. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 
20, 421-430. doi:10.1037/law0000021 
Alison, L., Alison, E., Noone, G., Elntib, S., Waring, S., & Christiansen, P. (2014b). 
Whatever you say, say nothing: Individual differences in counter interrogation 
tactics amongst a field sample of right wing, AQ inspired and paramilitary 
terrorists. Personality and Individual Differences, 68, 170-175. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2014.04.031 
Alison, L., Giles, S., & McGuire, G. (2015). Blood from a stone: Why rapport works and 
torture doesn't in 'enhanced' interrogations. Investigative Interviewing: Research 
and Practice, Special Issue (Advanced online publication), 5-23.  
Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (2001). Efficacy of the theory of planned behaviour: A 
meta-analytic review. British Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 471-499.  
Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. (2013). Trust, conflict, and cooperation: A meta-analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 139, 1090-1112. doi:10.1037/a0030939 
Beune, K., Giebels, E., & Sanders, K. (2009). Are you talking to me? Influencing 
behaviour and culture in police interviews. Psychology, Crime & Law, 15, 597-
617. doi:10.1080/10683160802442835 
Birch, S. A., & Bloom, P. (2007). The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false beliefs. 
Psychological Science, 18, 382-386. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01909.x 
Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 10, 214-234. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2  
Bowman, M. N. (2010). Truth or consequences: Self-incriminating statements and 
informant veracity. New Mexico Law Review, 40, 10-19.  
Brandon, S. E. (2011). Impacts of psychological science on national security agencies 
post-9/11. American Psychologist, 66, 495-506. doi:10.1037/a0024818 
60 
 
Brandon, S. E. (2014). Towards a science of interrogation. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
28, 945-946. doi:10.1002/acp.3090 
Bull, R. (2014). Investigative interviewing. New York: Springer. 
Burgoon, J. K., Buller, D. B., Floyd, K., & Grandpre, J. (1996). Deceptive realities sender, 
receiver, and observer perspectives in deceptive conversations. Communication 
Research, 23, 724-748.  
Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, M. (1989). The curse of knowledge in economic 
settings: An experimental analysis. The Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1232-
1254.  
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (2012). Attention and self-regulation: A control-theory 
approach to human behavior. New York: Springer Science & Business Media. 
Clemens, F. (2013). Detecting lies about past and future actions: The strategic use of 
evidence (SUE) technique and suspects’ strategies. Doctoral Dissertation, 
Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg.  
Clemens, F., Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2011). Eliciting cues to false intent: A 
new application of strategic interviewing. Law and Human Behavior, 35, 512-
522. doi:10.1007/s10979-010-9258-9 
Davis, M. H., Conklin, L., Smith, A., & Luce, C. (1996). Effect of perspective taking on 
the cognitive representation of persons: A merging of self and other. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 713-726. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.70.4.713 
DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., & Epstein, J. A. (1996). 
Lying in everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 979-
995. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.979 
Evans, J. R., & Fisher, R. P. (2011). Eyewitness memory: Balancing the accuracy, 
precision and quantity of information through metacognitive monitoring and 
control. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25, 501-508. doi:10.1002/acp.1722 
Evans, J. R., Houston, K. A., Meissner, C. A., Ross, A. B., LaBianca, J. R., Woestehoff, S. 
A., & Kleinman, S. M. (2014). An empirical evaluation of intelligenc-gathering 
interrogation techniques from the United States army field manual. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 28, 867-875. doi:10.1002/acp.3065 
Evans, J. R., Meissner, C. A., Brandon, S. E., Russano, M. B., & Kleinman, S. M. (2010). 
Criminal versus HUMINT interrogations: The importance of psychological 
science to improving interrogative practice. The Journal of Psychiatry & Law, 
38, 215-249. doi:10.1177/009318531003800110  
Evans, J. R., Meissner, C. A., Ross, A. B., Houston, K. A., Russano, M. B., & Horgan, A. 
J. (2013). Obtaining guilty knowledge in human intelligence interrogations: 
Comparing accusatorial and information-gathering approaches with a novel 
experimental paradigm. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 
2, 83-88. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2013.03.002 
Fallon, M. (2014). Collaboration between practice and science will enhance interrogations. 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28, 949-950. doi:10.1002/acp.3091 
Fein, R. A., Lehner, P., & Vossekuil, B. (2006). Educing information, Interrogation: 
Science and art, foundations for the future. Washington DC: National Military 
Intelligence College Press. 
61 
 
Fisher, R. P., & Geiselman, R. E. (1992). Memory-enhancing techniques for investigative 
interviewing: The cognitive interview. Springfield: Charles C Thomas, Publisher. 
Fisher, R. P., & Geiselman, R. E. (2010). The cognitive interview method of conducting 
police interviews: Eliciting extensive information and promoting therapeutic 
jurisprudence. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 33, 321-328. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijlp.2010.09.004 
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2013). Social cognition: From brains to culture. New Delhi: 
Sage. 
Galinsky, A. D., Maddux, W. W., Gilin, D., & White, J. B. (2008). Why it pays to get 
inside the head of your opponent the differential effects of perspective taking 
and empathy in negotiations. Psychological Science, 19, 378-384. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02096.x  
Galinsky, A. D., & Mussweiler, T. (2001). First offers as anchors: The role of 
perspective-taking and negotiator focus. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 81, 657-669. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.4.657 
Geiselman, R. E. (2012). The cognitive interview for suspects (CIS). American College of 
Forensic Psychology, 30, 1-16.  
Global Terrorism Index. (2014). Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism.   
Retrieved from 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism 
Goldsmith, M., Koriat, A., & Weinberg-Eliezer, A. (2002). Strategic regulation of grain 
size memory reporting. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 131, 73-
95. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.131.1.73 
Goodman-Delahunty, J., Martschuk, N., & Dhami, M. K. (2014). Interviewing high value 
detainees: Securing cooperation and disclosures. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
28, 883-897. doi:10.1002/acp.3087 
Granhag, P. A. (2010). The Scharff-technique: Background and first scientific testing. 
Paper presented at the Professional Development Seminar, High-value Detainee 
Interrogation Group (HIG, FBI). Washington, DC. 
Granhag, P. A., Cancinos Montecinos, S., & Oleszkiewicz, S. (2015). Eliciting 
intelligence from sources: The first scientific test of the Scharff technique. 
Legal and Criminological Psychology, 20, 96-113. doi:0.1111/lcrp.12015 
Granhag, P. A., & Hartwig, M. (2008). A new theoretical perspective on deception 
detection: On the psychology of instrumental mind-reading. Psychology, Crime 
& Law, 14, 189-200. doi:10.1080/10683160701645181 
Granhag, P. A., & Hartwig, M. (2015). The strategic use of evidence (SUE) technique: A 
conceptual overview. In P. A. Granhag, A. Vrij, & B. Verschuere (Eds.), 
Deception detection: Current challenges and new approaches (pp. 231-251). 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Granhag, P. A., Hartwig, M., Mac Giolla, E., & Clemens, F. (2015). Suspects’ verbal 
counter-interrogation strategies. In P. A. Granhag, A. Vrij, & B. Verschuere 
(Eds.), Detecting Deception: Current Challenges and Cognitive Approaches (pp. 
293-313). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
62 
 
Granhag, P. A., Mac Giolla, E., Strömwall, L. A., & Rangmar, J. (2013). Counter-
interrogation strategies among small cells of suspects. Psychiatry, Psychology 
and Law, 20, 705-712. doi:10.1080/13218719.2012.729021 
Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2004). The detection of deception in forensic 
contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., Willén, R. M., & Hartwig, M. (2013). Eliciting cues to 
deception by tactical disclosure of evidence: The first test of the evidence 
framing matrix. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 18, 341-355. 
doi:10.1111/j.2044-8333.2012.02047.x 
Granhag, P. A., Vrij, A., & Meissner, C. A. (2014). Information gathering in law 
enforcement and intelligence settings: Advancing theory and practice. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 28, 815-816. doi:10.1002/acp.3093 
Grice, H. P. (1970). Logic and conversation: Elsevier. 
Gudjonsson, G. H. (2003). The psychology of interrogations and confessions: A handbook. 
Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons. 
Hartwig, M., & Bond Jr, C. F. (2011). Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-
analysis of human lie judgments. Psychological bulletin, 137, 643-659. 
doi:10.1037/a0023589 
Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Kronkvist, O. (2006). Strategic use of 
evidence during police interviews: When training to detect deception works. 
Law and Human Behavior, 30, 603-619. doi:10.1007/s10979-006-9053-9 
Hartwig, M., Luke, T. J., & Skerker, M. (in press). Ethical perspectives on interrogation: 
An analysis of contemporary techniques. J. Jacobs & J. Jackson (Eds.), 
Handbook of Criminal Justice Ethics. 
Hartwig, M., Meissner, C. A., & Semel, M. D. (2014). Human intelligence interviewing 
and interrogation: Assessing the challenges of developing an ethical, evidence-
based approach. In R. Bull (Ed.), Investigative Interviewing (pp. 209-228). New 
York: Springer. 
Herbig, K. L. (2008). Changes in espionage by Americans: 1947-2007. Monterey, CA: 
Defence Personnel Security Research Center. 
Hoffman, D. H., Carter, D. J., Lopez, C. R. V., Benzmiller, H. L., Guo, A. X., Latifi, S. Y., 
& Craig, D. C. (2015). Report to the Special Committee of the Board of 
Directors of the American Psychological Association: Independent Review 
Relating to APA Ethics Guidelines, National Security Interrogations, and 
Torture. Chicago: Sidley Austin LLP. 
Idson, L. C., Chugh, D., Bereby Meyer, Y., Moran, S., Grosskopf, B., & Bazerman, M. 
(2004). Overcoming focusing failures in competitive environments. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 17, 159-172. doi:10.1002/bdm.467 
Inbau, F. E., Reid, J. E., Buckley, J. P., & Jayne, B. C. (2013). Essentials of the Reid 
technique. Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Publishers. 
Johnson, N. D., & Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 32, 865-889. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007 
Justice, B., P, Bhatt, S., Brandon, S., E, & Kleinman, S., M. (2010). Army Field Manual 
2-22.3 interrogation methods: A science-based review. Washington, D.C. (Draft, 
September).  
63 
 
Kassin, S. M., & Kiechel, K. L. (1996). The social psychology of false confessions: 
Compliance, internalization, and confabulation. Psychological Science, 7, 125-
128. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1996.tb00344.x 
Kelly, C. E., Miller, J. C., Redlich, A. D., & Kleinman, S. M. (2013). A taxonomy of 
interrogation methods. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 19, 165-178. 
doi:10.1037/a0030310 
Kleinman, S. M. (2006). KUBARK counterintelligence interrogation review: 
Observations of an interrogator. In R. A. Fein, P. Lehner, & B. Vossekuil (Eds.), 
Educing information, Interrogation: Science and art, foundations for the future 
(pp. 95-140). Washington DC: National Military Intelligence College Press. 
Kramer, L. A., & Heuer, R. J. (2007). America's increased vulnerability to insider 
espionage. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 20, 
50-64. doi:10.1080/08850600600888698 
Lassiter, G., & Meissner, C. A. (2010). Police interrogations and false confessions: 
Current research, practice, and policy recommendations. Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychological Association. 
Loftus, E. F. (2011). Intelligence gathering post-9/11. American Psychologist, 66, 532-
541. doi:10.1037/a0024614 
Luke, T. J., Dawson, E., Hartwig, M., & Granhag, P. A. (2014). How awareness of 
possible evidence induces forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 28, 876-882. doi:10.1002/acp.3019 
May, L., Granhag, P. A., & Oleszkiewicz, S. (2014). Eliciting intelligence using the 
Scharff technique: Closing in on the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic. 
Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 11, 136-150. 
doi:10.1002/jip.1412 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of 
organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20, 709-734. 
doi:10.5465/AMR.1995.9508080335  
Meissner, C. A., Hartwig, M., & Russano, M. B. (2010). The need for a positive 
psychological approach and collaborative effort for improving practice in the 
interrogation room. Law and Human Behavior, 34, 43-45. doi:10.1007/s10979-
009-9205-9 
Meissner, C. A., Redlich, A. D., Bhatt, S., & Brandon, S. (2012). Interview and 
interrogation methods and their effects on true and false confessions. Campbell 
Systematic Reviews, 13, 325-352. doi:10.4073/csr.2012.13 
Memon, A., Meissner, C. A., & Fraser, J. (2010). The cognitive interview: A meta-
analytic review and study space analysis of the past 25 years. Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law, 16, 340. doi:10.1037/a0020518 
Obama, B. (2009). Executive Order 13491—Ensuring Lawful Interrogations. American 
Presidency Project.  
Redlich, A. D. (2007). Military versus police interrogations: Similarities and differences. 
Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 13, 423-428. 
doi:10.1080/10781910701665741 
64 
 
Redlich, A. D., Kelly, C. E., & Miller, J. C. (2011). Systematic survey of the interview and 
intelligence community. Federal Bureau of Investigation/High-Value Detainee 
Interrogation Group: Washington, DC. 
Rivard, J. R., Fisher, R. P., Robertson, B., & Hirn Mueller, D. (2014). Testing the 
cognitive interview with professional interviewers: Enhancing recall of specific 
details of recurring events. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28, 917-925. 
doi:10.1002/acp.3026 
Russano, M. B., Meissner, C. A., Narchet, F. M., & Kassin, S. M. (2005). Investigating 
true and false confessions within a novel experimental paradigm. Psychological 
Science, 16, 481-486. doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01560.x  
Russano, M. B., Narchet, F. M., Kleinman, S. M., & Meissner, C. A. (2014). Structured 
interviews of experienced HUMINT interrogators. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 28, 847-859. doi:10.1002/acp.3069 
Scharff, H. J. (1950). Without torture. Argosy, 39, 87–91.  
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (2014). The United States senate report on CIA 
detention interrogation program. Retrieved from 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/sscistudy1.pdf 
Shawyer, A., Milne, B., & Bull, R. (2013). Investigative interviewing in the UK. In T. 
Williamson, B. Milne, & S. Savage (Eds.), International developments in 
investigative interviewing (pp. 24-38). New York: Routledge. 
Shumate, S., & Borum, R. (2006). Psychological support to defense counterintelligence 
operations. Military Psychology, 18, 283-296. doi: 
10.1207/s15327876mp1804_3 
Soufan, A. H. (2011). The black banners: The inside story of 9/11 and the war against al-
Qaeda. New York: Norton. 
Stone, J. A., Shoemaker, D. P., & Dotti, N. R. (2010). Interrogation: World War II, 
Vietnam, and Iraq (W. Spracher Ed.). Washington DC: National Defence 
Intelligence College. 
Taylor, P. J. (2002). A cylindrical model of communication behavior in crisis negotiations. 
Human Communication Research, 28, 7-48. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
2958.2002.tb00797.x 
Taylor, P. J. (2014). The role of langauage in conflict and conflict resolution. In T. 
Holtgraves (Ed.), Handbook of Language and Social Psychology (pp. 459-470). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Tekin, S., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L., Mac Giolla, E., Vrij, A., & Hartwig, M. (2015). 
Interviewing strategically to elicit admissions from guilty suspects. Law and 
Human Behavior, 39, 244-252. doi:10.1037/lhb0000131 
Thagard, P. (1992). Adversarial problem solving: Modeling an opponent using 
explanatory coherence. Cognitive Science, 16, 123-149. doi:10.1016/0364-
0213(92)90019-Q 
The Constitution Project. (2013). Report of The Constitution Project's Task Force on 
Detainee Treatment. Retrieved from 
http://detaineetaskforce.org/report/download/:  
Toliver, R. (1997). The interrogator: The story of Hanns Joachim Scharff master 
interrogator of the Luftwaffe. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing Ltd. 
65 
 
US Army. (2006). United States army field manual 2-22.3: Human intelligence collector 
operations. Washington DC: Headquarters: Department of the Army. 
Vallano, J. P., & Schreiber Compo, N. (2015). Rapport-building with cooperative 
witnesses and criminal suspects: A theoretical and empirical review. Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law, 21, 85-99. doi:10.1037/law0000035 
Walsh, D., & Bull, R. (2012). Examining rapport in investigative interviews with 
suspects: Does its building and maintenance work? Journal of Police and 
Criminal Psychology, 27, 73-84. doi:10.1007/s11896-011-9087-x 
Vrij, A. (2008). Detecting lies and deceit: Pitfalls and opportunities (2 ed.). Chichester, 
England: Wiley. 
Vrij, A., & Granhag, P. A. (2012). Eliciting cues to deception and truth: What matters are 
the questions asked. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 1, 
110-117. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2012.02.004 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Kristen, S., & Fisher, R. P. (2007). Cues to deception and ability to 
detect lies as a function of police interview styles. Law and Human Behavior, 
31, 499-518. doi:10.1007/s10979-006-9066-4 
  
I 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 2 
Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for the difference between the Scharff technique and direct 
approach interviews for each aspect in each study and meta-analytic weighted effect size 
as well as its confidence interval 
Note. aWeighted effect sizes computed under a fixed-effect model. *Not examined. 
 
Aspect Study I Study II Study III Mean Weighted da 
[95% CI] 
1) New information 
revealed 
1.14 0.68 0.82 0.82 [0.60, 1.03] 
2) Ascribed interviewer 
knowledge  
1.91 1.42 2.32 1.93 [1.68, 2.18] 
3) Incorrectly ascribed 
interviewer knowledge  
0.17 0.31 1.08 0.68 [0.47, 0.89] 
4) Information collected 
with claims/questions 
0.70 0.03 * 0.27 [-0.04, 0.57] 
5) Perceived new 
information revealed 
-0.24 -0.28 -0.12 -0.18 [-0.39, 0.02] 
6) Difficulty assessing 
interviewer’s objectives 
-0.08 -0.57 -0.57 -0.48 [-0.69, -0.27] 
